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THE U.S. MILITARY’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION EFFORTS: UNEXPECTED ECO-
FRIENDLY SOLUTIONS TO LAND 
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS 
Abstract: The military’s historically destructive relationship with the environ-
ment and its several national security exemptions from compliance with federal 
environmental laws would appear to indicate that the military’s mission is inher-
ently at odds with environmental protection. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (“DoD”) has recently demonstrated a significant interest in ensuring 
military readiness by reducing potential impediments to normal military opera-
tions on DoD installations. Often cumulatively referred to as “encroachment,” 
these outside pressures include land-use restrictions from federal environmental 
laws as well as more direct interference from nearby civilian populations, such as 
noise complaints and light pollution. By pursuing initiatives that reduce en-
croachment issues on military bases, the DoD has developed several adaptive so-
lutions to its land management challenges—to wit: compatible-use buffering 
programs that create space between military lands and nearby civilian popula-
tions, cooperative partnerships with interested stakeholders outside military ba-
ses, and various Service-specific conservation policies. These efforts seek to pro-
duce the “win-win” outcome of responsibly managing natural resources on and 
surrounding DoD lands while simultaneously protecting national security 
through increased military training capabilities and decreased geopolitical insta-
bility (a consequence of climate change). This Note seeks to fill a gap in the liter-
ature by arguing that Congress and the public should encourage the military’s 
successful land management efforts by substantially increasing the employment 
of land buffering programs and collaborative partnerships near military bases, as 
authorized by the Sikes Act of 1960 and 10 U.S.C. § 2684(a). This Note further 
argues that other government agencies with land management responsibilities 
should apply the DoD’s lessons to develop policies that effectively balance mis-
sion requirements with environmental interests. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite broad bipartisan support for environmental protection in the 
1970s, Congress has since grown increasingly divided and politically grid-
locked over federal environmental regulation.1 This legislative stalemate has 
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occurred against a backdrop of gloomy projections for the future environmen-
tal health of the planet, an outlook arguably worsened by the federal govern-
ment’s recent erosion of key environmental policies.2 Since taking office in 
2017, President Donald J. Trump has prioritized broad federal deregulation, 
particularly seeking to nullify environmental laws that his administration views 
as overly burdensome to the fossil fuel industry.3 The main targets of such de-
regulation efforts have been major Obama-era policies aimed at combating 
climate change.4 Relatedly, the diminished role of government agencies that 
are tasked with enforcing federal environmental policy, such as the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), indicates the federal government’s first 
                                                                                                                           
Carl Omark, John Gordon, Joan Shear, Robert Dreher, Ya Wei Li, and the editors of the Boston Col-
lege Law Review. 
 1 Daniel A. Farber, The Conservative as Environmentalist: From Goldwater and the Early 
Reagan to the 21st Century, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1005, 1024 (2017); Richard J. Lazarus, A Different 
Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 999, 1026 (2003); Dan-
iel A. Farber, The Thirty Years War Over Federal Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 413, 419 (2013) [here-
inafter Farber, The Thirty Years War] (reviewing THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE 
LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013)); see CHRISTOPHER M. KLYZA & DAVID J. 
SOUSA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 1 (updated & expanded ed., 2013) 
(describing congressional bipartisanship on environmental issues during the late 1960s and 1970s and 
the current gridlock in Congress). 
 2 KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 1, at 1; see Matthew Kotchen, Opinion, How the Trump Admin-
istration Distorts Analysis of Key Environmental Rules, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan. 29, 2018), https://
e360.yale.edu/features/how-the-trump-administration-distorts-analysis-of-key-environmental-rules 
[https://perma.cc/YU75-WSQ9] (arguing that the policies of the Trump Administration and then-
EPA-Administrator Scott Pruitt are eroding federal environmental rules by reversing major Obama-
era policies). See generally Jonathan Owen, The Planet’s Future: Climate Change “Will Cause Civili-
sation to Collapse,” THE INDEPENDENT (July 11, 2009), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/
climate-change/the-planets-future-climate-change-will-cause-civilisation-to-collapse-1742759.html 
[https://perma.cc/5R9X-4D38] (discussing the 2009 State of the Future Report and discussing gloomy 
projections for the future of the environment). 
 3 Eric Lipton et al., “This Is Our Reality Now,” N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/26/us/politics/donald-trump-environmental-regulation.html [https://
perma.cc/9SKG-2ARV] (examining the Trump Administration’s federal regulatory rollback of envi-
ronmental policy by attempting to neutralize the most extensive Obama-era regulations); Nadja Popo-
vich et al., 76 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html [https://
perma.cc/5ZEH-78WB]. For two straight years, the Trump Administration has sought to reduce the 
EPA’s budget by 20–30%. Brady Dennis, Trump Budget Seeks 23 Percent Cut at EPA, Eliminating 
Dozens of Programs, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2018/02/12/trump-budget-seeks-23-percent-cut-at-epa-would-eliminate-dozens-of-
programs/?utm_term=.2db492344f3d [https://perma.cc/2RTV-8FK3]. 
 4 Popovich et al., supra note 3. In August 2017, the U.S. Department of State formally announced 
the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, one of the most significant international 
environmental agreements in the world’s history. Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of 
Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN
1AK2FM [https://perma.cc/FE4K-WVGS]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Communication Re-
garding Intent to Withdraw from Paris Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm [https://perma.cc/QB9V-V5JQ]. 
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significant retreat from its historic command over the environmental regulatory 
scheme in place since the 1970s.5 Nevertheless, amidst intensifying congres-
sional gridlock and the President’s dramatic rollback of federal environmental 
regulation, the U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”) has emerged as an unex-
pected innovator in the face of its own environmental challenges, especially in 
the realm of land management.6 
It is difficult to imagine two more unlikely allies than the DoD and the 
environment.7 Although the majority of Americans generally trust the military, 
much of the public naturally associates it with images of war and destruction—
from the devastating impact of atomic bomb tests on military bases in the 
Southwestern United States and the Pacific Ocean to the clouds of pollution 
trailing behind military war machines around the world.8 This public percep-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Miranda Green, EPA Numbers Hint at Eased Enforcement Under Trump, THE HILL (Feb. 13, 
2018), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/373478-epa-numbers-hint-at-eased-enforcement-
under-trump [https://perma.cc/U5C8-Q56H] (noting that in 2017, the EPA recommended prosecution 
in one hundred fewer pollution cases than in the previous year, suggesting a downward trend). These 
federal enforcement shortfalls have spurred a different type of legal challenge, leaving individual 
states, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and private citizens to carry the bulk of the regula-
tory burden by bringing suits to compel compliance with or enforcement of environmental laws. Po-
povich et al., supra note 3; see Kevin Haroff, Private Enforcement of U.S. Environmental Laws—Why 
Standing Still Matters, MARTEN LAW (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/2017
0905-private-enforcement-environmental-laws [https://perma.cc/42G7-PF7X] (predicting increasing 
numbers of suits by private citizens to compel federal agencies to enforce environmental laws); see 
also Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012) (providing mechanisms for private 
citizens to bring suit against those who fail to comply with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)); 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2012) (providing that any citizen may commence a 
civil action against any person—including government agency officials like the EPA Administrator—
for either violating or not enforcing the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
166 (1997) (holding that any person can sue under the Endangered Species Act). 
 6 See David W. Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Con-
gressional Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 60–61, 96 (2014) (discussing the current 
political gridlock over federal environmental policy); Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental 
Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879, 879, 881, 893 (2014) (explaining that, although the U.S. Department 
of Defense (“DoD”) is the nation’s single largest consumer of energy, the DoD has approached this 
negative role as an opportunity to pursue innovative renewable energy development initiatives). 
 7 See The Surprising Role the Military Plays in Environmental Protection, KNOWLEDGE@
WHARTON (July 29, 2014), knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/military-environmental-protection 
[https://perma.cc/7VQH-VRA4] [hereinafter The Surprising Role] (arguing that, despite the common 
conception of the military standing directly opposed to environmental laws, the DoD’s role as a high-
demand energy consumer indicates that it may significantly help shape environmental policy). 
 8 See Jason Nulton, The Shifting Public Perception of America’s Veterans, TASK & PURPOSE 
(May 14, 2015), https://taskandpurpose.com/the-shifting-public-perception-of-americas-veterans/ 
[https://perma.cc/ATB2-R84J] (noting that, despite public sentiment toward America’s armed con-
flicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the public’s support of the military is still high); Lydia Saad, Military, 
Small Business, Police Still Stir Most Confidence, GALLUP (June 28, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/
poll/236243/military-small-business-police-stir-confidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/474B-G7D6] (find-
ing that, among the American institutions listed in the poll, the military engenders the highest public 
confidence, with 74% of Americans having a “[g]reat deal” or “[q]uite a lot” of confidence in the 
military); U.S. Military Is Trusted but Unfamiliar to the Public, ASS’N OF THE U.S. ARMY (May 15, 
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tion of the military as a destructive force and an enemy of the environment is 
not entirely unwarranted; deliberate military actions have resulted in some of 
the worst manmade environmental disasters in history.9 For example, part of 
the U.S. military’s strategy in the Vietnam War involved its large-scale use of 
napalm as well as Agent Orange and other deadly chemical herbicides to de-
stroy jungles across Southeast Asia, leading critics to first coin the term “eco-
cide.”10 Additionally, the Gulf War oil spill of 1991, which involved retreating 
Iraqi forces releasing over 240 million gallons of crude oil into the Persian 
Gulf to prevent U.S. forces from attempting beach landings, is still considered 
the worst oil spill in human history.11 It is also considered one of the first in-
stances of substantial natural resource destruction and pollution being used as a 
tactic of war.12 Finally, even within the United States, the DoD has historically 
faced scrutiny over its improper hazardous waste disposal and its lengthy de-
lays in cleaning up contamination on military bases.13 
                                                                                                                           
2017), https://www.ausa.org/news/us-military-trusted-unfamiliar-public [https://perma.cc/TZC5-
RTF8] (noting that studies show that the U.S. military is one of the most trusted institutions); see also 
The Surprising Role, supra note 7 (discussing how the military’s mission appears to conflict with 
environmental protection aims). 
 9 See Michael J. Lawrence et al., The Effects of Modern War and Military Activities on Biodiver-
sity and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. REV. 443, 443 (2015) (discussing the impacts of armed conflict 
and military training on the ecosystem). 
 10 Maura O’Connor, 10 Worst Man-Made Environmental Disasters, PRI (May 3, 2010), https://
www.pri.org/stories/2010-05-03/10-worst-man-made-environmental-disasters [https://perma.cc/
LLN8-KCD7]; see Ecocide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/ecocide [https://perma.cc/ZZ95-KL6G] (defining ecocide as “the destruction of large 
areas of the natural environment as a consequence of human activity”). 
 11 Michael Castellani & Andrew Stuhl, The Gulf War Oil Spill: A Man-Made Disaster, ENV’T & 
SOC’Y (2018), http://www.environmentandsociety.org/tools/keywords/gulf-war-oil-spill-man-made-
disaster [https://perma.cc/J65W-5EZR]. 
 12 Id. Decades later, the Persian Gulf region is still feeling the detrimental effects of the oil spill, 
including uninhabitable coastlines and a devastating loss of marine biodiversity. Id.; Laura Moss, The 
13 Largest Oil Spills in History, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (July 16, 2010), https://www.mnn.
com/earth-matters/wilderness-resources/stories/the-13-largest-oil-spills-in-history [https://perma.cc/
2XDE-6NM2]; Mark Tutton, Lessons Learned from the Largest Oil Spill in History, CNN (June 4, 
2010), www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/06/04/kuwait.oil.spill/index.html [https://perma.cc/F8K7-
W7R4]. Another devastating environmental disaster caused by Iraqi forces during the Persian Gulf 
War was the 1991 burning of Kuwait’s oil fields, in which retreating Iraqi forces set fire to over six 
hundred oil wells to prevent their future use and to disrupt advancing U.S. and coalition forces. Rex J. 
Zedalis, Burning of the Kuwaiti Oilfields and the Laws of War, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 711, 713–
14 (1991); Landsat Top Ten—Kuwait Oil Fires, NASA (July 23, 2012), https://www.nasa.gov/
mission_pages/landsat/news/40th-top10-kuwait.html [https://perma.cc/97EW-MGW6]. In total, over 
one billion barrels of oil were lost between January and November 1991, either burned up or spread 
across the desert and the Persian Gulf, causing heavy and irreversible pollution of the soil and air. 
Bernard Rostker, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Environmental Exposure Report: Oil Well Fires, ARCHIVE.
TODAY (Aug. 2, 2000), http://archive.is/jTSH1 [https://perma.cc/RGX8-VF3Q]. 
 13 See Richard A. Wegman & Harold G. Bailey, Jr., The Challenge of Cleaning Up Military 
Wastes When U.S. Bases Are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 867–68 (1994) (discussing contamina-
tion problems that the DoD has faced when closing bases, and noting that in the early 1990s, the Pen-
tagon characterized its need to clean up toxic and hazardous waste sites at DoD bases as its “largest 
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Federal statutes also reflect the seeming incompatibility of military and 
environmental interests.14 Although the DoD must generally comply with envi-
ronmental regulations to the same extent as other federal agencies, the DoD 
enjoys several exemptions when compliance with such regulations would pose 
a threat to national security.15 The most recent and broad assertion of this au-
thority occurred after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (“9/11”), when 
the Pentagon requested several blanket exemptions to federal environmental 
laws in arguably questionable instances, mostly to avoid potential restrictions 
on military training and combat operations.16 The DoD’s mission of ensuring 
national security and military readiness thus appears inherently at odds with 
environmental protection efforts.17 
                                                                                                                           
challenge”). Military bases are similar to small cities in many ways, including the amount of contami-
nated waste they produce. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP: TOO MANY 
HIGH PRIORITY SITES IMPEDE DOD’S PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 21, 1994), https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/
219533.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3C6-GB3P] [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP]. The DoD ac-
tivities that cause the greatest environmental and health concerns on its installations are those that 
cause petroleum and lead contamination, such as industrial operations to repair and maintain military 
equipment, as well as the manufacture and testing of weapons and ammunition. U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-830T, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP: NUMBERS OF CONTAMINAT-
ED FEDERAL SITES, ESTIMATED COSTS, AND EPA’S OVERSIGHT ROLE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 11 (Sept. 11, 2015) (statement of J. Alfredo Gómez, Dir., Nat. Res. & 
Env’t), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672464.pdf [https://perma.cc/9892-ER7T] [hereinafter HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP]; see also ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, supra, at 1. Even prior to the fed-
eral environmental regulations enacted in the 1970s, decades of poor hazardous waste management 
practices had already contaminated millions of acres of soil and water on military installations within 
the United States and abroad. HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra, at 11; see Wegman & Bailey, 
supra, at 867. Around 130 contaminated military sites are currently listed on the EPA’s National Pri-
orities List (“NPL”), which contains the most serious uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste 
sites throughout the United States and its territories. HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra, at 11–12; 
see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 9620(e)(2) (2012) (requiring remedial action and interagency agreement by the relevant 
federal agency head and the EPA Administrator within 180 days of a contaminated site’s listing on the 
NPL). 
 14 See DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22149, EXEMPTIONS FROM ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 
(May 15, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22149.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSF8-AUNC] (discuss-
ing the DoD’s various national security exemptions from compliance with environmental laws and the 
Pentagon’s historic assertions of such exemptions). Various provisions within the international law of 
armed conflict prohibit the use of weapons to cause extensive environmental damage, further indicat-
ing an inherent incompatibility between military war-waging activity and environmental protection. 
See DAVE WALLACE & SHANE REEVES, Modern Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, in U.S. 
MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 41, 60–61 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2015); 
see also infra note 65 (discussing specific provisions). 
 15 BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
 16 Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 125–26 (2007); see BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 1 (providing an in-depth analy-
sis of the national security exemptions from compliance with federal environmental laws). 
 17 See The Surprising Role, supra note 7 (explaining that a common narrative of the DoD’s rela-
tionship with the environment is one of conflict). 
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Nevertheless, as the nation’s single largest energy consumer and polluter, 
as well as one of its five largest land managers, the DoD has an unavoidable 
relationship with the environment.18 In particular, the DoD’s twenty-six mil-
lion acres of land are home to more than four hundred federally-listed endan-
gered and threatened wildlife species—some of which only exist on DoD 
lands—resulting in significant land restrictions under the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”).19 In fact, DoD bases provide habitat for a greater number of 
threatened or endangered species than National Park Service lands.20 Addition-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Light, supra note 6, at 881; Alexander Nazaryan, The U.S. Department of Defense is One of the 
World’s Biggest Polluters, NEWSWEEK (July 17, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/07/25/us-
department-defence-one-worlds-biggest-polluters-259456.html [https://perma.cc/XPR7-5KG3]; see 
John C. Cruden et al., The Local Environment at the U.S. Department of Defense, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11,057, 11,057 (2013) (noting that, in total, the DoD manages an area roughly equivalent in size to the 
state of Pennsylvania); HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 11 (explaining that the DoD 
reported to Congress in 2014 that it had 38,804 sites that were contaminated by petroleum, lead, un-
exploded ordnance, or discarded military munitions); OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. 
FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENV’T, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT RE-
PORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 15 (2013), https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/Reports/FY%
202012%20AEMR.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2XU-EUWP] (noting that energy consumption by the DoD 
accounted for approximately one percent of the nation’s total energy use in 2011, more than any other 
public or private organization). In addition to its need for fuel to power its many vehicles and pieces 
of equipment, the DoD’s immense energy consumption is also due to its need to maintain several 
hundred thousand buildings at over 5,000 military sites around the world. Cruden et al., supra, at 
11,058. Regarding its role as a polluter, around 130 contaminated military sites are listed on the 
EPA’s NPL, which catalogs the nation’s most serious uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste 
sites. HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 11–12. DoD sites comprise 80% of the NPL. 
Id. at 12. 
 19 DEP’T OF DEF., BASE STRUCTURE REPORT—FY 2018 BASELINE 2, 15 (2017) [hereinafter BASE 
STRUCTURE REPORT]; J. DOUGLAS RIPLEY, Legal and Policy Background, in NATURESERVE, CON-
SERVING BIODIVERSITY ON MILITARY LANDS 54, 54–55, 64 (2008); Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 
11,058–59; see Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012) (providing ESA 
provisions); see, e.g., Katie Campbell, More Than A Lark: The Military’s Surprising Role in Protect-
ing Endangered Species, OPD (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.opb.org/news/series/battleready/battle-
ready-wildlife-on-bases/ [https://perma.cc/AN75-B844] (describing how prairies on Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, Washington, provide habitat for endangered streaked horned larks, of which there are only 
approximately 2,000 remaining in the world). The ESA provides mechanisms for protecting federally-
listed endangered and threatened fish and wildlife species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544; Federal Facili-
ties and Other Environmental Laws and International Environmental Requirements, EPA (2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/federal-facilities-and-other-environmental-laws-and-international-
environmental [https://perma.cc/L7KJ-R49V]; see Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(1), 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2012) (requiring federal agencies to implement programs that promote the con-
servation of listed species); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring federal agencies to ensure that 
their actions do not jeopardize listed species or their habitats). 
 20 See Bruce A. Stein et al., Federal Lands and Endangered Species: The Role of Military and 
Other Federal Lands in Sustaining Biodiversity, 58 BIOSCIENCE 339, 343 (2008) (explaining that 
“lands of the [U.S. Department of Agriculture’s] Forest Service and the DOD share the distinction of 
supporting the greatest number of species with formal status under the ESA. Lands of both agencies 
harbor about 23% of the ESA status species included in [the study’s] analysis, with each agency host-
ing at least 355 such species. These two agencies are followed by the [National Park Service] (19%), 
the [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] (18%), and the [Bureau of Land Management] (16%), respective-
ly”); see also U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., 2010 SPECIES STATUS SUMMARY (2010), https://www.nature.
2019] The U.S. Military’s Environmental Protection Efforts 1029 
ally, because the DoD operates its many buildings, ships, aircraft, armored ve-
hicles, and other equipment on land, air, and waterways within U.S. jurisdic-
tions, federal pollution standards under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), Clean 
Air Act (“CAA”), and other environmental statutes directly apply to military 
activities within the United States.21 Although the broad wartime exemptions 
within these statutes permit the military to mostly ignore federal environmental 
mandates in the name of national security, the DoD has pioneered several initi-
atives over the last decade that seek to protect the environment, sometimes 
even exceeding federal requirements.22 
The DoD’s three most significant environmental initiatives are its une-
quivocal recognition of climate change as a national security threat throughout 
the last thirty years, its commitment to both reduce its fossil fuel reliance and 
transition to renewable energy sources, and its creative land management pro-
grams on DoD installations.23 The primary objective of these efforts is to en-
sure military readiness by combating “encroachment,” which is defined as “the 
cumulative result of any and all outside influences that inhibit normal military 
                                                                                                                           
nps.gov/biology/endangeredspecies/assets/docs/SpeciesStatusSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AP-
ZKJA] (providing statistics on the numbers of threatened and endangered (“T&E”) species on Nation-
al Park Service lands). 
 21 See DAVIS INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. & FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUND., 2018 INDEX OF 
U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH 14, 321–93 (2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-
10/2018_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6LW-FE9A] (providing the total num-
ber of vehicles, aircraft, ships, weapons, and other equipment operated by each of the services within 
the DoD); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012) (providing the provisions of the 
CWA applicable to federal facilities); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012) (providing air quality 
standards applicable to federal facilities); 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (providing standards for hazardous mate-
rials storage and disposal on federal facilities under CERCLA); see also Atomic Energy Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13 (2012) (regulating all phases of nuclear energy production and the produc-
tion of radioactive materials). 
 22 See The Surprising Role, supra note 7 (arguing that despite the apparent conflict between the 
military’s mission and environmental protection, the DoD in fact has an important role to play in sup-
porting renewable energy research and development); see also Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,063–
64 (noting the DoD’s creative land management efforts and arguing that more political leaders should 
recognize the DoD’s environmental initiatives when considering future budget cuts for federal agen-
cies); Telephone Interview with Robert Dreher, Senior Vice President of Defenders of Wildlife, in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Interview with Dreher] (explaining that despite common 
perceptions of the DoD as an enemy of the environment, the DoD is, in fact, “leading the charge” in 
environmental protection in many ways, especially through many of its programs that seek to con-
serve endangered wildlife species on military lands, often exceeding federal statutory requirements). 
 23 Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 1772, 1775–76, 1793 (2014); see Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,062 (discussing the coordi-
nation between the DoD and the Department of the Interior (“DOI”), and arguing that the DoD acts a 
leader in land management and environmental stewardship through several initiatives). See generally 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGIC SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE PLAN FY 2016, at 1–5 (2016), https://
www.denix.osd.mil/sustainability/dod-sspp/unassigned/department-of-defense-strategic-sustainability-
performance-plan-fy-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4C8X-AA5Q] (providing a performance review of the 
DoD’s operations that seek to decrease its energy consumption, reduce its fossil fuel reliance, and devel-
op renewable energy sources, as well as other DoD efforts to address climate change concerns). 
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training, testing, and operations.”24 Notwithstanding this security-focused im-
petus, the DoD’s initiatives also serve to protect the environment by curbing 
geopolitical instability caused by climate change, to conserve limited natural 
resources, and to protect endangered wildlife species on DoD installations.25 
Although the DoD’s renewable energy initiatives and recognition of cli-
mate change are remarkable efforts, this Note focuses on the DoD’s critical 
land management challenges and its various adaptive initiatives to solve those 
threats to national security.26 Most significantly, these land conservation efforts 
include the military’s employment of compatible-use buffer zones under the 
DoD’s Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration (“REPI”) program, 
as well as various conservation and natural resource management policies and 
practices.27 This Note first argues that there are areas in which the DoD can 
                                                                                                                           
 24 RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54; see JOHN ELWOOD, Too Close for Comfort: Encroachment on 
Military Lands, in NATURESERVE, supra note 19, at 74–75 (defining encroachment as “external influ-
ences that can have the effect of threatening or constraining training”); see also ROBERT LOZAR, U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS (ARR-MI) 2 
(2003), http://acwc.sdp.sirsi.net/client/es_ES/default/index.assetbox.assetactionicon.view/1045367 
[https://perma.cc/GV2K-3HDH] (defining encroachment as “any outside activity, law, or pressure that 
affects the ability of military forces to train to doctrinal standards or to perform the mission assigned 
to a military installation”); Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Readiness of the H. Armed 
Services Committee, 5 (May 16, 2002) (statement of Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (Readiness) & Raymond F. DuBois, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations 
and the Environment)), http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/test02-05-16MayberryDuBois.rtf [https://perma.cc/
4FYJ-F77N] (providing that the DoD defines encroachment as “the cumulative result of any and all 
outside influences that inhibit necessary training and testing”). Although encroachment is generally 
considered any “infringement on one’s rights or property,” the military uses the term specifically to 
describe “the cumulative result of any and all outside influences that inhibit normal training and test-
ing.” LTC Joseph L. Knott & Nancy Natoli, Compatible Use Buffers: A New Weapon to Battle En-
croachment, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS MAG. 1 (2004), http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/
PDFs%20for%20Oct-Dec%2004/Knott-Natoli2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8L4-QUQ3]. The pressures of 
encroachment take several forms, but generally fall under two main categories: land-use restrictions 
imposed by state and federal environmental regulations (e.g., ESA, MMPA, CERCLA, Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”), and CWA) and more direct forms of interference resulting from the proximity of civilian 
developments to DoD installations (e.g., conflicts with civilian parties regarding noise complaints, 
light pollution, limited commercial airspace and telecommunications frequencies, and safety concerns 
for nearby civilian populations). ELWOOD, supra, at 74–76; LOZAR, supra, at 2; Babcock, supra note 
16, at 126 n.105; see infra notes 136–162 and accompanying text (discussing the specific effects of 
encroachment on military operations). 
 25 See Light, supra note 6, at 893 (noting that the DoD’s energy operations recognize that climate 
change, caused partly by the military’s significant use of fossil fuels, may increase the likelihood of 
geopolitical instability and future armed conflict); Conservation Lands as Compatible Use Buffers, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Dec. 2004), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/
esa-library/pdf/Buffer_Lands_Fact_Sheet_dec05.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2ZJ-K7J3] [hereinafter CUB 
Fact Sheet] (explaining that both civilian populations and military bases benefit from the DoD’s com-
patible-use buffer areas). 
 26 See Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 443 (discussing the impact of armed conflict on the envi-
ronment in general). 
 27 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54–55 (discussing the DoD’s buffering programs); U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., 2017 READINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INTEGRATION (REPI) PROGRAM 
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more effectively manage natural resources on military installations both in the 
United States and abroad—especially in the realms of cleaning up contaminat-
ed sites and expanding its use of buffer zones—in order to become a better 
environmental steward while protecting national security interests.28 This Note 
further contends that the federal government should direct greater public atten-
tion toward the DoD’s adaptive solutions to its land management challenges 
because of the spillover potential for such programs to be replicated outside of 
the military context.29 Finally, this Note argues that Congress should capitalize 
on the DoD’s land management successes by providing greater incentives for 
other federal agencies to follow the DoD’s example, especially in its compati-
ble land-use partnerships and ESA-related conservation efforts.30 
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of the conditions sur-
rounding the DoD’s unexpected ascension as a leader in environmental stew-
ardship, including the recent federal recoil from environmental regulation and 
enforcement, the national security exemptions to environmental law, and the 
nexus between the military and the environment.31 Part II of this Note discuss-
es several of the DoD’s major land management challenges as well as its adap-
tive solutions to such problems.32 Finally, Part III of this Note argues that there 
are areas in which the DoD can improve upon and capitalize on its environ-
mental successes, and that Congress and the President would be well served to 
encourage other government agencies to replicate the DoD’s responsible land 
management policies.33 
I. THE ROAD TO CONFLICT: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOD’S 
NECESSARY ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Based on the DoD’s significant energy demand and its need to use its 
training lands destructively at times, federal environmental laws that place re-
strictions on fuel and land use would appear to naturally hinder military objec-
tives.34 The Pentagon’s past assertions of national security exemptions to envi-
                                                                                                                           
CHALLENGE 1 (Apr. 2017), http://www.repi.mil/Portals/44/Documents/REPI_Challenge/2017REPI
Challenge.pdf?ver=2017-05-01-171128-017 [https://perma.cc/J6EU-YEY6] (discussing the DoD’s 
Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration (“REPI”) program and the program’s allocation 
of up to $10 million for land conservation programs in 2017); Army Compatible Use Buffer (ACUB) 
Program, U.S. ARMY ENVTL. COMMAND, https://www.aec.army.mil/index.php?cID=329 [https://
perma.cc/QKP3-627C] (describing the Army’s Compatible Use Buffer program). 
 28 See infra notes 209–215 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 216–227 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 228–249 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 34–119 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 120–208 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 209–249 and accompanying text. 
 34 See The Surprising Role, supra note 7 (discussing how the military’s mission appears to con-
flict with environmental protection aims). 
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ronmental laws further suggest that environmental interests conflict with the 
DoD’s mission.35 Nevertheless, there is a close nexus between the military’s 
national security mission and the environment, indicating that the DoD has a 
significant incentive to serve as a responsible manager of military lands.36 
This Part provides a brief overview of the circumstances that have neces-
sitated the DoD’s innovation in environmental protection policy.37 Section A of 
this Part explains the current legislative stalemate over federal environmental 
policy.38 Section B discusses the DoD’s national security exemptions from en-
vironmental law compliance, which would naturally suggest an incompatibility 
between the military’s mission and the environment.39 Finally, Section C de-
scribes the close nexus between the military and the environment, underscor-
ing the necessity of the DoD’s role as a responsible land manager.40 
A. The DoD’s “Call to Arms”: Contemporary Political  
Gridlock Over the Environment 
In America’s early years, environmental policy focused predominantly on 
encouraging natural resource development, especially in the western United 
States.41 By the 1970s, however, national social unrest and numerous conserva-
tion movements led to sweeping federal environmental legislation.42 Following 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the creation of the EPA in 
1970, Congress passed numerous environmental regulatory statutesincluding 
the CAA and CWAthat established federal standards for air and water quali-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 1–2 (discussing the DoD’s various national security exemp-
tions from compliance with environmental laws); Light, supra note 6, at 879 (noting that the mili-
tary’s ability to largely ignore federal environmental laws that conflict with its national security mis-
sion would indicate that military and environmental interests are naturally in conflict). The DoD’s 
official mission is “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our 
country.” About the Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.
defense.gov/About/ [https://perma.cc/V27Y-HXUE]. 
 36 Interview with Dreher, supra note 22; see Light, supra note 6, at 891 (noting that the military’s 
national security mission is closely connected with environmental concerns by the military’s energy 
use). But see Light, supra note 6, at 891(suggesting that, although the DoD’s role as a high-demand 
energy consumer creates an opportunity for coordination between the military and energy sustainabil-
ity, military interests may be incompatible with habitat conservation and wildlife protection). 
 37 See infra notes 41–119 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 41–63 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 64–86 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 87–119 and accompanying text. 
 41 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1147–48 (1995). 
 42 Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1240 (2014); 
Case, supra note 6, at 55; see Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environ-
mental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 164–65 (describing the revolutionary nature of 1970s 
environmental protection legislation). 
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ty.43 Additionally, in 1973, Congress enacted the ESA, which established 
mechanisms to identify and “list” threatened and endangered wildlife species 
and provided expansive federal protections for those listed species.44 Finally, 
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(“RCRA”), and later the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), both of which created standards 
for hazardous waste management and contaminated site cleanup.45 These envi-
ronmental statutes apply to both public and private actors, as well as to both 
state and federal agencies.46 
The programs created in the 1970s radically enhanced the federal role in 
regulating environmental policy, creating a “command-and-control” ap-
                                                                                                                           
 43 Case, supra note 6, at 56; Percival, supra note 41, at 1160–61; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2012) (providing CWA provisions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012) (providing CAA provi-
sions); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4332(2)(c) 
(2012) (providing NEPA provisions). 
 44 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (“FWS”) summarizes the “listing” 
of a species that warrant ESA protection as follows: 
Before a plant or animal species can receive the protection provided by the ESA, it 
must first be added to the Federal lists of threatened and endangered wildlife and plants. 
The List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife (50 CFR 17.11) and the List of En-
dangered and Threatened Plants (50 CFR 17.12) contain the names of all species of 
mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fishes, insects, plants, and other creatures that 
have been determined by [the FWS] and [National Marine Fisheries Service] (for most 
marine life) to be in the greatest need of Federal protection. 
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., LISTING A SPECIES AS A THREATENED OR ENDANGERED SPECIES: 
SECTION 4 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1 (2016), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/
pdf/listing.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR89-XR4P]. The FWS, like other federal agencies, “follow[s] a 
strict legal process known as a rulemaking (or regulatory) procedure” when it considers listing a new 
species or changing the classification of a certain species. Id. This rulemaking process includes pub-
lishing notices that the agency plans to review a rule, gathering information and soliciting comments 
about the proposed rule, and publishing the final rule. Id. at 1–2. 
 45 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CER-
CLA”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601–9675 (West 2018) (establishing CERCLA’s framework for the cleanup of 
contaminated sites at facilities no longer in use); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012) (establishing standards for solid waste management, in-
cluding hazardous waste control, at facilities that are currently in use). The RCRA focuses on compre-
hensive management and transport of solid and hazardous waste at facilities that are currently in use, and 
CERCLA aims to remediate abandoned or non-operating sites that are contaminated by hazardous waste. 
RCRA vs. CERCLA, INST. FOR TRIBAL ENVTL. PROF’LS (July 10, 2015), http://www7.nau.edu/itep/main/
hazsubmap/twrap_hzsubmap_rcra-cercla.asp [https://perma.cc/M4TM-VQWZ]. 
 46 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (requiring each federal agency to ensure that its actions do not jeop-
ardize the existence of any endangered or threatened species identified under the ESA, and requiring 
that federal agencies cooperate with the DOI to assess potential harmful impacts on wildlife); 33 
U.S.C. § 1252(a) (applying the CWA’s duties to cooperate in water pollution management to federal 
agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (requiring all federal agencies to conform their administrative procedures 
to NEPA); id. § 6901(21) (including the United States Government in CERCLA’s definition of appli-
cable “person[s]”); id. § 6961 (applying solid waste disposal requirements of the RCRA to federal 
facilities); id. § 7401(c) (providing that the primary goal of the CAA is to encourage action by all 
levels of government to prevent pollution). 
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proach.47 Under this approach, the federal government devises the rules, estab-
lishes permitting processes, supervises all regulated activities, and enforces 
rules by imposing penalties for noncompliance.48 Several key executive branch 
agencies are responsible for carrying out these tasks as they relate to environ-
mental policy, including the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), the De-
partment of the Interior (“DOI”), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”).49 As the federal agency specifically charged with executing envi-
ronmental protection policy, however, the EPA acts in a supervisory role, issu-
ing various regulations to federal and state agencies and enforcing standards 
when states, other agencies, and private entities do not comply.50 
The role of federal agencies in executing land and natural resource man-
agement policy is underscored by the fact that the federal government possess-
es around 640 million acres, which accounts for about twenty-eight percent of 
the total 2.27 billion acres of land in the United States.51 Four major federal 
agencies manage 610.1 million acres of this land: the BLM, the Fish and Wild-
life Service (“FWS”) and National Park Service within the DOI, and the U.S. 
Forest Service (“USFS”) within the USDA.52 In addition, the DoD manages 
(either owns, leases, or possesses) over twenty-six million acres of land within 
the United States; these DoD lands consist of thousands of military bases, 
which contain huge numbers of buildings, infrastructure facilities, and training 
and munitions ranges.53 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Case, supra note 6, at 56–57, 62. 
 48 Blake Hudson, Relative Administrability, Conservatives, and Environmental Regulatory Re-
form, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1661, 1677 (2016). 
 49 See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND 
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (Mar. 3, 2017) (examining the various agencies that administer 
the land owned by the federal government). 
 50 Our Mission and What We Do, EPA (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-
mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/W6Q5-FVN4]. 
 51 See VINCENT ET AL., supra note 49, at 1 (providing data on each agency’s land management 
responsibilities). 
 52 Id. The FWS is the primary agency that manages species of fish and wildlife in the United 
States, enforcing federal wildlife laws and coordinating protection efforts with other federal agencies, 
state departments of fish and game, NGOs, and private landowners. About the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.fws.gov/help/about_us.html 
[https://perma.cc/SX7X-9EUH]. 
 53 BASE STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 19, at 2, 7, 16, 72; VINCENT ET AL., supra note 49, at 1. 
The DoD only owns about one-third of the lands it manages within the United States and instead leas-
es or is otherwise granted a legal interest in the bulk of lands on which it operates from other federal 
or state government agencies. See BASE STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 19, at 15–16, 72 (providing 
data for the DoD’s land management portfolio, current as of September 2017); VINCENT ET AL., supra 
note 49, at 1, 6 (discussing the DoD’s management of federal lands). Additionally, the DoD manages 
approximately 500,000 acres of land across hundreds of bases in foreign countries; only owning about 
two percent of those lands. See BASE STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 19, at 88 (providing data on the 
DoD’s real estate portfolio in other countries worldwide); see also David Vine, The United States 
Probably Has More Foreign Military Bases Than Any Other People, Nation, or Empire in History, 
THE NATION (June 14, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-probably-has-more-
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Since its creation, the federal environmental regulatory scheme has pro-
duced cleaner air and water, conserved over 1600 endangered plant and animal 
species in the United States, and protected millions of acres of critical habitats.54 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s, this system garnered criticism from con-
servative Republicans and spurred partisanship over the federalization of envi-
ronmental policy.55 For example, critics contended that federal environmental 
regulations were expensive and wasteful because they imposed unrealistic objec-
tives and deadlines on state governments and private entities, regardless of local 
conditions or whether costs outweighed benefits.56 Reflecting this viewpoint, 
and empowered by President Ronald Reagan’s call for widespread federal de-
regulation in the early 1980s, conservative Republican legislators advocated for 
the reduction of environmental protection budgets and weakening of enforce-
ment mechanisms.57 Although these efforts to diminish the federal government’s 
role eventually failed, the confrontational nature of these campaigns increased 
the divide between the two major political parties over environmental issues.58 
Therefore, despite overwhelming support for federal environmental regulation in 
the 1970s, Congress reached a legislative stalemate over environmental policy 
by the twenty-first century.59 Although the federal government under President 
Barack Obama succeeded in enacting several new policies aimed at combatting 
                                                                                                                           
foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-or-empire-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/V33K-
8ZW9] (discussing the DoD’s many bases around the world). 
 54 Noah Greenwald, The Endangered Species Act: A Wild Success, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DI-
VERSITY, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_wild_success/ [https://perma.cc/M7JB-
H756]; see Ray Vaughan, Proof of “Prohibited Takings” Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 421 § 1 (1994) (Apr. 2018) (explaining that since its enactment, the ESA 
has served as a model for the statutory conservation of wildlife and noting several “success stories”); 
Daniel Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation to 21st Cen-
tury Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 10–11 (2017) (discussing the success of the 1970s regulations in 
reducing air and water pollution); Michael T. Maloney & Bruce Yandle, Estimation of the Costs of Air 
Pollution Control Regulation, 11 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 244, 246 (1984) (arguing that the 1970s 
regulatory framework was the best possible approach to reducing pollution). 
 55 Case, supra note 6, at 59; see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1236 (1995) (discussing the conservative Republican critiques of the federal regulatory 
scheme). 
 56 David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a 
Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 27–28 (2001). Similarly, critics argue that 
the federal command-and-control approach to environmental regulation includes overly broad regula-
tions that hold differently situated geographic regions to unreasonably similar standards. Id. at 28. 
 57 Case, supra note 6, at 58–59; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1027. In the 1994 congressional elec-
tions, many conservative Republicans ran on platforms that prioritized the reduction of federal envi-
ronmental regulations. Case, supra note 6, at 59. After winning a majority in Congress, Republicans 
introduced a flood of legislative measured that were designed to weaken or eliminate major environ-
mental policies. Id. 
 58 Id.; see KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing increased partisanship in Congress 
since 1990). 
 59 Aagaard, supra note 42, at 1282; Case, supra note 6, at 57, 60–61; Farber, The Thirty Years 
War, supra note 1, at 419. 
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climate change, environmental debates in today’s factionalized political climate 
continue to serve as proxies for the general ideological conflict over the appro-
priate extent of federal authority.60 
The increased partisanship over environmental policy during the last few 
decades led to the “cooperative federalism” approach, which relies on a more 
collaborative, less top-down, regulatory framework.61 Under this approach, the 
federal government issues mandatory standards that the states must enforce, 
and which the federal government and private citizens may enforce when 
states fail do to do so.62 Private entities and states are not the only actors, how-
ever, that must comply with laws and regulations under the federal environ-
mental regulatory framework—federal agencies, like the DoD, are also bound 
by such mandates but with several statutory exceptions.63 
B. National Security Exemptions from Federal Environmental Law 
Along with a few other agencies tasked with protecting national security, 
the DoD is unique in environmental law in that environmental regulations of-
ten must compromise when they conflict with the military’s national security 
mission.64 By permitting these national security exceptions, several federal 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Aagaard, supra note 42, at 1282; see Case, supra note 56, at 25–26. 
 61 Constitutional Considerations: State Versus Federal Environmental Policy Implementation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env’t & the Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th 
Cong. (July 11, 2014) (statement of Jonathan H. Adler, Director, Center for Business Law and Regu-
lation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law) [hereinafter Adler Statement]. 
 62 Id. In the cooperative federalism approach, the federal government usually provides the states 
with some type of financial aid and gives them the option of taking the lead in implementing federal 
regulatory programs. Id. If a state fails to accept this offer, the federal government will regulate in 
place of the state. Id. Additionally, private citizens may initiate a “citizen suit” to compel a federal 
agency to enforce a statute. Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizens Suits, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUT-
LOOK 4, 4 (1995). Congress modeled the environmental citizen suit provisions in the major anti-
pollution statutes after those in the civil rights acts. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-
Revolution—The Kepone Incident and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 701 
(1995). 
 63 See Adler Statement, supra note 61, at 12 (discussing the roles of public, private, state, and 
federal actors in the cooperative federalism framework of modern environmental policy); see, e.g., 16 
U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (requiring federal agencies to “cooperate with [s]tate and local agencies to resolve 
water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered species”). 
 64 See Light, supra note 6, at 888 (discussing the military’s unique position of being exempt from 
many environmental statutes due to its national security mission); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 12–13, 18–19 (2008) (holding that where the President, the White House’s 
Council on Environmental Quality, and the Secretary of the Navy had previously determined that 
exemptions or waivers from ESA requirements were in the interest of national security, the Court 
vacated a preliminary injunction against the U.S. Navy for its use of sonar that potentially affected 
nearby marine mammals off the coast of California). The other main federal entity responsible for 
national security is the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC. (Aug. 29. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/mission [https://perma.cc/WQ64-RFH8]. The agen-
cies within the DHS that are focused on national security—e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard, United States 
Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), and the Federal 
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statutes indicate that environmental protection and national security aims are 
inherently in opposition.65 For example, nearly all federal environmental laws 
include a provision that allows the President to grant time-limited, renewable 
waivers excepting specified agency activities from the law’s requirements if 
such waivers are in the interests of national security.66 Additionally, agency 
                                                                                                                           
Emergency Management Agency—are tasked with missions including “preventing terrorism and 
enhancing security; managing our borders; administering immigration laws; securing cyberspace; and 
ensuring disaster resilience.” Id.; see Operational and Support Components, U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://perma.
cc/G3UA-NUHS] (providing information on each of the agencies within the DHS). Congress created 
the DHS in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, grouping twenty-two federal government 
departments and agencies into one, cohesive Cabinet agency. Creation of the Department of Home-
land Security, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/creation-
department-homeland-security [https://perma.cc/9U8H-2WCS]. Like the DoD, the DHS may also 
seek exemptions from environmental statutes to protect national security. See VINCENT ET AL., supra 
note 49, at 23–24 (“[T]he Secretary of the [DHS] has authority under law to waive NEPA and other 
environmental laws for construction of fencing and other barriers along the U.S. international borders 
to deter illegal crossings.”). 
 65 Light, supra note 6, at 888. Although not containing exemptions, various provisions under the 
international law of armed conflict also suggest an inherent incompatibility between military activity 
and environmental protection by expressly prohibiting the use of weapons to cause extensive envi-
ronmental destruction during war. See WALLACE & REEVES, supra note 14, at 41, 60–61 (discussing 
provisions of the international law of armed conflict that require commanders to consider environmen-
tal consequences when determining whether to use a certain weapon during war); see, e.g., Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 35(3) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that “it is 
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”); id. art. 55 (“[Parties to armed 
conflict must ensure] in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and 
severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare 
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby 
to prejudice the health or survival of the population.”). 
 66 Light, supra note 6, at 888; see, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012) 
(providing that “[t]he [EPA] Administrator shall waive compliance with any provision of this chapter 
upon a request and determination by the President that the requested waiver is necessary in the interest 
of national defense”); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (2012) (providing 
that “the President may, upon written request from the Secretary [of the Interior], exempt from com-
pliance those elements of the Federal agency activity that are found by the Federal court to be incon-
sistent with an approved State program, if the President determines that the activity is in the para-
mount interest of the United States”); 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012) (providing that “[t]he President may 
exempt any effluent source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from 
compliance with any such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the 
United States to do so”); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h–7(h) (2012) (providing that 
“[t]he President may exempt any potential source under the jurisdiction of any department, agency, or 
instrumentality in the executive branch if the President determines it to be in the paramount interest of 
the United States to do so”); 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2012) (providing that “[t]he President may exempt 
any solid waste management facility of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive 
branch from compliance with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of 
the United States to do so”); id. § 7418(b) (2012) (providing that “[t]he President may exempt any 
emission source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compli-
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heads are sometimes delegated authority to make national-security-based ex-
ception determinations without further executive or congressional review.67 
Congress also provided a blanket exemption from environmental regulation for 
military construction projects in times of national emergency or after declara-
tions of war.68 Furthermore, the Administrative Procedure Act exempts the mil-
itary from certain environmental regulations in situations involving armed con-
flict or emergencies.69 Although NEPA does not contain an explicit national 
security exemption, courts have also been deferential to military aims when 
asked to enforce NEPA’s requirements against the military.70 Finally, although 
it is not a legislative act, Executive Order 12,866 also exempts the military 
from complying with environmental regulatory obligations in situations in-
volving armed conflict or emergency situations.71 
The DoD has requested broad national security exemptions to environ-
mental laws at the onset of every major armed conflict since the 1970s.72 The 
                                                                                                                           
ance with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to 
do so”). 
 67 Light, supra note 6, at 888–89; see, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1371(f)(1) (West 2018) (permitting the Secretary of Defense’s own determination of what 
is “necessary for national defense”); id. § 1536(j) (permitting the Secretary of Defense’s own determi-
nation of the national security interest); National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 306101(a), 306102 (West 2014) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations 
exempting agencies from certain provisions “in the event of a major natural disaster or an imminent 
threat to the national security”). 
 68 Military Construction Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 2808 (West 2017); Light, supra note 6, at 889. 
 69 Light, supra note 6, at 890; see Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(G), 
701(b)(1)(G) (2012) (exempting any “military authority exercised in the field in time of war” from 
judicial review and procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 70 Babcock, supra note 16, at 115–16; Light, supra note 6, at 890; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waving 
sovereign immunity). For example, courts have construed provisions of NEPA as suggesting that 
environmental impacts of U.S. military forces operating in other countries need not be assessed in 
instances of armed conflict and emergency situations. Light, supra note 6, at 890; see Valley Citizens 
for a Safe Env’t v. Vest, No. 91-30077-F, 1991 WL 330963, at *3 (D. Mass. May 30, 1991) (quoting 
the language of 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012), which provides that NEPA only requires that agencies com-
ply with its provisions “to the fullest extent possible”). 
 71 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (exempting from 
White House review any federal agency’s regulations or rules, including those relating to the envi-
ronment, that involve the military or foreign affairs function of the United States). 
 72 See BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 1–5 (chronicling the wartime exemptions requested by the 
DoD since 2002); Babcock, supra note 16, at 115 (describing the Pentagon’s asserted exemption to 
completing Environmental Impact Statements during the 1991 Persian Gulf War); see, e.g., National 
Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2004 (“NDAA FY2004”) § 318, Pub. L. No. 108-136 (2003) 
(allowing the DOI to exempt DoD installations from critical habitat designation, which is the DOI’s 
process of designating land as habitat essential to a species’ conservation, and which requires agencies 
to ensure that their actions do not destroy or adversely modify that habitat); Bob Stump National De-
fense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (“NDAA FY2003”) § 311, Pub. L. No. 107-436 (2002) 
(allowing the DoD to obtain permits for incidental taking of migratory birds “during authorized mili-
tary readiness activity,” thereby exempting such activity from restrictions imposed by the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”)); see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)(A) (West 
2016) (codifying the Pentagon’s previously asserted exemption from the federal mandate to release 
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Pentagon asserted its most significant exemptions from environmental law 
compliance following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, presumably to ensure that mili-
tary readiness and training efforts were not hindered during the Armed Forces’ 
mobilization for conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq.73 Although Congress did not 
grant all of the exemptions that the DoD asserted were necessary, it did grant 
significant exemptions from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”), the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), and certain provisions of the 
ESA.74 
Several military and political leaders claim that military exemptions are 
necessary because environmental laws are overly burdensome and significant-
ly encroach upon military readiness and training objectives.75 In past exemp-
tion requests, the Pentagon cited specific examples of federal environmental 
restrictions hindering military operations.76 For instance, at Camp Pendleton in 
Southern California, the Marine Corps claimed that units were limited to using 
only one mile of its seventeen-mile shoreline for critical amphibious landing 
exercises and that they were forced to maneuver non-tactically single-file 
through protected habitat areas due to several ESA restrictions.77 Pentagon of-
                                                                                                                           
environmental impact statements for its wartime operations in the Persian Gulf War in 1991); Exec. 
Order No. 12,244, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,443, 66,443 (Oct. 3, 1980), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,553, 51 
Fed. Reg. 7237 (Feb. 25, 1986) (exempting Fort Allen in Puerto Rico from compliance with the 
CWA, CAA, NCA, and RCRA for one year due to the fort’s importance to Cold War national de-
fense). 
 73 See BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that since 2002, the DoD has sought more expansive 
exemptions from environmental laws, arguing that such exemptions were necessary to guarantee mili-
tary readiness). 
 74 Id.; see NDAA FY2004 § 319, Pub. L. No. 108-136 (exempting DoD installations from the 
DOI’s critical habitat designation (pursuant to the ESA) provided that the installation has implement-
ed an effective integrated natural resources management plan, which is a planning document designed 
to integrate planned military operations with conservation measures under 16 U.S.C. § 670a (2012)); 
id. § 318(b) (amending the ESA’s requirements for critical habitat designations to require that the DOI 
consider national security interests before designating an area as critical habitat); Pub. L. No. 107-314, 
116 Stat. 2458 § 315 (2002) (providing that section 2 of the MBTA shall not apply to the incidental 
taking of a migratory bird by a member of the Armed Forces during an authorized military readiness 
activity). Congress rejected assertions by the Pentagon of exemptions from various provisions of the 
CAA, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and CERCLA. BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 1; Caitlin Sislin, 
Exempting Department of Defense from Federal Hazardous Waste Laws: Resource Contamination as 
“Range Preservation”?, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647, 649 (2005) (chronicling the failed attempts of the 
DoD to get relief from the RCRA and CERCLA since 2002); see, e.g., National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for FY 2006 § 312, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006) (rejecting the DoD’s requests 
for exemptions from the RCRA and CERCLA). 
 75 Light, supra note 6, at 891; see Babcock, supra note 16, at 126 n.106 (discussing examples of 
military training being sacrificed due to encroachment by environmental laws and regulations). 
 76 Exempting the Military from Environmental Regulations, ACOUSTIC ECOLOGY INST. (2007), 
https://www.acousticecology.org/srmilitaryenviroexempt.html [https://perma.cc/XKZ4-2VLN]. Most 
of the Pentagon’s cited examples of land-use restrictions by environmental regulations involve federal 
laws that seek to protect endangered species and their habitats, such as the ESA. See id. 
 77 Id. Camp Pendleton provides another example of the inherent conflict between military instal-
lations and nearby civilian development; for many years, private and public interest groups in South-
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ficials asserted that these restrictions were the result of increased civilian de-
velopment around the installation pushing the last remaining wildlife in the 
region onto the base’s mostly untouched training areas.78 
Conversely, conservation organizations have argued that military exemp-
tions undermine federal regulatory policy with inconsistent standards by allow-
ing greater environmental destruction in locales where the DoD operates.79 For 
example, opponents of military exemptions note that, in 2002, Congress grant-
ed the DoD a broad exemption from the MBTA’s restrictions against the “inci-
dental taking” (killing) of endangered birds and the harming of such birds’ 
habitats.80 The legislation, part of a broader defense spending measure, also 
mandated a more streamlined permitting process by the DOI to ensure that the 
bombings could continue.81 Another target of critique by environmental groups 
is the Navy’s use of sonar.82 Environmental groups argue that sonar harms ma-
rine mammals that use echolocation, as demonstrated in cases of whales and 
                                                                                                                           
ern California have sought transfer of the Marine base to the State of California for recreation or busi-
ness uses. See Joe Mathews, How Long Can the Military Defend Camp Pendleton?, ZOCALO PUB. 
SQUARE (Sept. 24, 2018), www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/09/24/long-can-military-defend-camp-
pendleton/ideas/connecting-california [https://perma.cc/8D66-ZAPZ]; see also infra notes 134–165 
and accompanying text (examining encroachment of civilian populations near DoD bases as a threat to 
military readiness). 
 78 Exempting the Military from Environmental Regulations, supra note 76. Additionally, at the 
Barry Goldwater Range in Arizona, the Air Force claimed to have redirected or canceled thirty per-
cent of their live munition drop missions each year to avoid impacts on the Sonoran pronghorn ante-
lope. Id. Commanders claimed that these types of restrictions posed dangerous threats to military 
readiness because they prevented units from training under realistic conditions to prepare for combat 
deployments. Id. 
 79 Light, supra note 6, at 891; see Babcock, supra note 16, at 131, 146 (characterizing the mili-
tary’s efforts to obtain permanent, rather than temporary, exemptions as “troubling”). But cf. John S. 
Applegate, National Security and Environmental Protection: The Half-Full Glass, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
350, 364 (1999) (reviewing STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996)) 
(noting that, despite the many national security exemptions to environmental laws, such exemptions 
are rarely invoked). 
 80 Exempting the Military from Environmental Regulations, supra note 76, at 4; see NDAA 
FY2003 § 315, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002) (directing the DOI to create a more 
streamlined permitting process for the DoD’s incidental taking of migratory birds). This exemption 
occurred after a federal district court preliminarily enjoined the Navy from further test bombing a 
small island in Guam due to the exercise’s past excessive killing of migratory birds. See Ctr. for Bio-
logical Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177–78 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the Navy’s bomb-
ing activities, which resulted in the unintentional taking of migratory birds, violated the MBTA), va-
cated by Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, Nos. 02-5163, 02-5180, 2003 WL 179848, at *1 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 113 (D.D.C. 
2002) (enjoining the Navy and the Air Force from using the bombing range), vacated by England, 
2003 WL 179848, at *1 (vacating the lower court’s preliminary injunction based on Congress’s pass-
ing of the NDAA FY2003). 
 81 National Defense Authorization Act FY2003 § 315; Exempting the Military from Environmen-
tal Regulations, supra note 76, at 4. 
 82 BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 5. 
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dolphins becoming beached due to burst eardrums.83 The Navy has successful-
ly invoked exemptions to the MMPA to defeat challenges by environmental 
groups in federal court and receive greater flexibility to employ low- and mid-
frequency active sonar and conduct underwater bombing exercises.84 Never-
theless, despite the DoD’s frequent assertions of broad national security ex-
emptions to environmental laws in times of armed conflict, scholars note that 
most military installations comply with federal environmental protection laws 
rather than seek national security exemptions.85 Those scholars suggest that 
such compliance efforts by the DoD are especially important given the mili-
tary’s inherent relationship with the environment.86 
C. The Military Nexus Between National Security  
and Environmental Protection 
The military’s mission of ensuring national security is directly connected 
to environmental protection efforts.87 First, the DoD is the nation’s single larg-
est consumer of energy.88 Additionally, the DoD maintains more than 300,000 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id.; Richard Sadler & Geoffrey Lean, Hi-Tech Military Sonar Systems “Are Killing Britain’s 
Whales and Dolphins,” INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2005), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/
hi-tech-military-sonar-systems-are-killing-britains-whales-and-dolphins-494661.html [https://perma.
cc/M2CG-CALS]; see e.g., Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of a pre-
liminary injunction against the Navy for its use of sonar that potentially affected nearby marine 
mammals); see also Colleen C. Karpinsky, A Whale of a Tale: The Sea of Controversy Surrounding 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the U.S. Navy’s Proposed Use of the SURTASS-LFA Sonar 
System, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 412 (2004) (discussing the negative impacts of the Navy’s 
use of sonar on marine mammals). 
 84 BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 4. In the NDAA FY2003, Congress provided the DoD with a 
broad exemption from the Marine Mammal Protection Act for reasons relating to “national defense.” 
NDAA FY2003 § 319; BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 4. The NDAA FY2003 also amended the defini-
tion of “harassment” of marine mammals as it applied to military readiness activities to require greater 
scientific evidence of harm before an activity would be considered “harassment” and required that the 
DOI consider the impacts on military readiness in issuing or denying permits for incidental takings. 
NDAA FY2003 § 319; BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 85 See Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,058 (discussing the extent to which DoD operations 
relate to the environment). The DoD spends around $4 billion per year on its environmental programs, 
compared to the EPA’s annual budget of $8 billion per year. Id. 
 86 See, e.g., Light, supra note 6, at 891 (discussing the close connection between the military and 
the environment); see also Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,058 (explaining the various ways in 
which the military is connected with the environment). 
 87 Light, supra note 6, at 891. 
 88 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, & ENV’T, DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 17 (2016), 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202015%20AEMR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HWB-
ZUPP] [hereinafter AEMR FY 2015]; Light, supra note 6, at 891. The DoD consumes around 
19,000,000 barrels of oil each day, which accounts for about 1% of total U.S. energy consumption and 
80% of the total federal government energy consumption. AEMR FY 2015, supra, at 17; Light, supra 
note 6, at 891. In fiscal year 2015, the DoD’s total energy usage cost $16.7 billion, with petroleum-
based liquid fuels comprising approximately two-thirds of that amount. AEMR FY 2015, supra, at 17. 
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buildings on over five hundred installations around the world, making it the 
nation’s largest manager of building space.89 The DoD also employs thousands 
of tactical vehicles, aircraft, ships, and other pieces of equipment, most of 
which rely on petroleum-based liquid fuels.90 Scholars conclude that the DoD’s 
energy requirements therefore create an inevitable role for the military in na-
tional energy policy and developing the renewables industry.91 
The DoD is also one of the top five land managers in the nation, maintain-
ing more than twenty-six million acres of federal public land, an area roughly 
equivalent to the state of Pennsylvania.92 The DoD leases much of this land from 
the DOI.93 DoD lands are rich in biodiversity and provide habitats for around 
420 federally listed threatened and endangered (“T&E”) species and 523 at-risk 
species.94 Of those numbers, ten T&E species and seventy-five at-risk species 
exist only on DoD installations.95 DoD lands have become so-called “islands of 
biodiversity” mostly because of the way in which military bases were historical-
ly developed.96 When they were originally built, many DoD installations were 
remote and isolated from civilian populations.97 As development from nearby 
cities pushed to the outer boundaries of DoD bases, wildlife species were often 
driven onto the only remaining undeveloped land nearby—vast military training 
areas.98 The locations of military bases also contribute to their biodiversity, as 
                                                                                                                           
 89 AEMR FY 2015, supra note 88, at 7. A DoD report notes that “[t]he [DoD’s building] footprint 
is three times that of Walmart and six times that of the General Services Administration (GSA).” OF-
FICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENV’T, DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE ANNUAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 4 (2012), https://www.acq.
osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202011%20AEMR.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQL8-29H6]. 
 90 See United States Military Strength, GLOBAL FIREPOWER (2018), https://www.globalfire
power.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=united-states-of-america [https://perma.
cc/VBF4-T8EC] (providing data on the DoD’s total air, land, and naval strength and equipment and 
noting the importance of oil to a country’s ability to fight wars). 
 91 Light, supra note 6, at 892; PEW PROJECT ON NAT’L SEC., ENERGY & CLIMATE, REENERGIZING 
AMERICA’S DEFENSE: HOW THE ARMED FORCES ARE STEPPING FORWARD TO COMBAT CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND IMPROVE THE U.S. ENERGY POSTURE 12–17 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_warming/Pew_Reenergizing20Americas20Defense20Report.
pdf [http://perma.cc/5E4-C74M]. 
 92 BASE STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 19, at 2, 15; Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 11,058. 
 95 Id. at 11,059. 
 96 See id. (explaining why DoD lands have become “islands of biodiversity,” or isolated areas that 
are rich in endangered and threatened wildlife species). The term biodiversity refers to the number and 
diversity of species, as well as the natural ecosystems and landscapes in which they live. BETH E. 
LACHMAN ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RES. INST., THE THIN GREEN LINE: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
DOD’S READINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INITIATIVE TO BUFFER INSTALLATION EN-
CROACHMENT 15–16 (2007) [hereinafter THIN GREEN LINE]. An ecosystem is a group of various 
species of plants, animals, and microorganisms interacting with one another and their environment. Id. 
at 15 n.45. 
 97 RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54; Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059. 
 98 THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 17; Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059. 
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many bases are situated strategically near coastlines, rivers, or other areas that 
serve some national security purpose.99 These locations are often also the type of 
habitats that provide the most valuable and diverse ecosystems for many species 
of plants and wildlife.100 
The final reason for the rich biodiversity of DoD bases is that historically, 
circumstances did not require the military to use the majority of its available 
land intensively.101 Large tracts of mostly untouched land on and surrounding 
DoD bases provide security for bases as well as necessary standoff distance 
between specific types of military training or dangerous weapons testing and 
any off-base civilian populations.102 These “safety buffer zones” are usually 
critical to certain military operations, such as flying aircraft, conducting 
nighttime operations without interference from nearby civilian light pollution, 
and firing munitions with large blast-radii into artillery impact areas.103 
The DoD’s role as a land manager is also connected to its production of 
immense amounts of waste, including municipal solid waste, waste water, and 
hazardous waste.104 Military installations are similar to small cities, especially 
in terms of their size, population, and generation of waste, both hazardous and 
non-hazardous.105 For decades, the DoD’s training exercises, munitions manu-
facturing, and routine operations have generated several types of hazardous 
waste.106 Past improper waste management practices often contaminated the 
air, soil, and groundwater on and around DoD bases, which continue to pose 
hazards to human health and the environment, requiring further restrictions by 
federal environmental laws such as CERCLA and the RCRA.107 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  
 102 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54 (explaining that the military’s need for large safety buffer 
zones to surround munition impact areas is one of the aspects of military training that is most incom-
patible with civilian development adjacent to DoD bases). 
 103 Id. at 54; Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059–60. In recent decades, however, the DoD has 
found it necessary to utilize more of its available and previously untouched land as civilian develop-
ment has crept closer to DoD bases and the changing nature of warfare has complicated the military’s 
mission and training requirements. RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54; Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 
11,059–60. 
 104 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. ENV’T, SAFETY, & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NETWORK & INFO. 
EXCH., DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2009, at 43–47 
(2009), https://www.denix.osd.mil/arc/arcfy2009/report/chapter-7-pollution-prevention/ [https://
perma.cc/U5T4-VDTP] [hereinafter DENIX ANNUAL REPORT] (providing data on the DoD’s waste 
generation). 
 105 ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 3. For example, the costs of the DoD’s munici-
pal solid waste management are higher than those of any other federal agency, totaling more than 
$150 million to dispose of approximately five million tons of solid waste annually. DENIX ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 104, at 45. 
 106 ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 3. 
 107 See HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 1 & n.1 (discussing past improper haz-
ardous waste disposal and the applicability of CERCLA and the RCRA); see also ENVIRONMENTAL 
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In many respects, the nexus between national security and the environ-
ment creates potential conflict between the military and conservation efforts, 
especially in the military’s role as a land manager.108 The military’s most de-
structive impacts on the environment include those resulting from active armed 
conflict, nuclear warfare, chemical contamination, waste disposal, and routine 
operations on military bases.109 Armed conflicts, in particular, often leave be-
hind devastated ecosystems as forgotten casualties of war, and little responsi-
bility is imposed on involved forces to contribute to restoration efforts.110 The 
modes of warfare that have the most visible impact on the environment, both 
positive and negative, include aircraft operations, naval operations, land-based 
conflict, and nuclear warfare.111 For example, landmines set across large areas 
have a destructive impact on whole regions by producing human and animal 
casualties and ripping apart the ground, even decades after the conflict has 
ended.112 Nevertheless, these types of unexploded ordnance areas can also help 
ecosystems recuperate after heavy armed conflict by creating a “no-man’s-
land” similar to a game reserve or wildlife park, as demonstrated by the recov-
ery of threatened crane populations in the demilitarized zone of the Korean 
Peninsula.113 
Routine military operations on DoD bases also contribute to the military’s 
destructive relationship with the environment.114 For instance, DoD activities 
have released hazardous substances such as petroleum and lead into the envi-
                                                                                                                           
CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 3–4 (discussing requirements for contaminated site cleanup placed on the 
DoD by CERCLA). Common types of hazardous waste found at DoD installations include petroleum, 
lead and other heavy metals, and corrosives and solvents. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, supra note 13, 
at 3. Although the majority of the DoD’s currently contaminated sites resulted from years of munition 
and equipment manufacturing, new sites continue to become contaminated due to improper fuel dis-
posal, fuel leaks, or fuel spills. HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 11. 
 108 See ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing the DoD’s contaminated 
sites); Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 443 (discussing the various forms of environmental degrada-
tion caused by military activity); see also Alexandre S. Wilner, The Environment-Conflict Nexus: 
Developing Consensus on Theory and Methodology, 62 INT’L J. 169, 175 (2007) (discussing the belief 
that national security and environmental protection efforts are in conflict). 
 109 Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 443. 
 110 Id. at 444. 
 111 See id. at 445–46 (explaining the specific environmental impact of each mode of warfare). 
 112 Id. at 446. 
 113 Hiroyoshi Higuchi et al., Satellite Tracking of White-Naped Crane Migration and the Im-
portance of the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 806, 806–12 (1996); Law-
rence et al., supra note 9, at 446. Similarly, although nuclear weapon testing devastates ecosystems in 
the short run, it may prove to be positive for local ecosystems over time due to human exclusion from 
those areas. Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 447. A demonstration of this concept was the return and 
later growth of biodiversity in ocean reef systems in the Marshall Islands, where the DoD had con-
ducted a significant number of nuclear weapons tests in the decades following World War II, prevent-
ing human activity in the area for subsequent decades. Id. (noting that “the size-frequency distribution, 
an indicator of biomass, of many fish taxonomic groups within former blast sites have been observed 
to be much greater than that of the surrounding waters unaffected by nuclear testing”). 
 114 Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 452. 
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ronment, primarily through industrial operations to repair military equipment, 
as well as through the DoD’s manufacturing and testing of weapons and am-
munition.115 Additionally, weapons training often results in local landscape 
alteration, vegetation destruction, chemical and heavy metal contamination, 
and the incidental killing or maiming of wildlife.116 Finally, military vehicle 
maneuvering often damages soil and vegetation, especially in fragile environ-
ments such as the Mojave Desert.117 Because of these examples of environ-
mental destruction by military activity, federal statutes and regulations often 
set limitations on the DoD’s intended use of its own lands, which may hinder 
military activity and readiness.118 Nevertheless, on several fronts, the DoD 
employs innovative tactics to answer these challenges without resorting to 
seeking exemptions from environmental laws.119 
II. MILITARY-ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION: THE DOD’S ADAPTIVE 
SOLUTIONS TO CRITICAL LAND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS 
To meet its official mission of protecting national security, the DoD has 
pursued several environmentally-focused initiatives that protect soldiers’ lives, 
improve military readiness, and reduce the likelihood of global conflict.120 Such 
                                                                                                                           
 115 ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 3; HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra note 
13, at 11. 
 116 Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 452. The most common and extensive live-fire training oc-
curs on small arms ranges, which are associated with extensive heavy metal contamination, with lead 
being the most notable contaminant. Xinde Cao et al., Weathering of Lead Bullets and Their Envi-
ronmental Effects at Outdoor Shooting Ranges, 32 J. ENVTL. QUAL. 526, 528 (2003). The weathering 
of lead bullets results in the contamination of soils, groundwater, and surface water sources, which 
reduces vegetation growth and species richness. Lawrence, supra note 9, at 453. 
 117 JEFFREY S. FEHMI, ET AL., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ERDC/CERL SR-01-17, IM-
PACTS OF MILITARY VEHICLE TRAINING ACTIVITIES ON VEGETATION 40 (2001); David Doxford & 
Alan Judd, Army Training: The Environmental Gains Resulting from the Adoption of Alternatives to 
Traditional Training Methods, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 45 J. ENVTL. 
PLAN. & MGMT. 245, 250 (2010); Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 452. Armored vehicles also some-
times hit and kill wildlife during training exercises. Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 452. Additional-
ly, fighter jet and helicopter training exercises pose constant threats to bird habitats near runways, and 
such aircraft often hit or kill birds during training and sustainment exercises. BARBARA B. BLACK ET 
AL., UNIV. OF FLA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & RANGE SCIS., TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 7, EFFECTS OF LOW 
LEVEL MILITARY TRAINING FLIGHTS ON WADING BIRD COLONIES IN FLORIDA (1984); Lawrence et 
al., supra note 9, at 456. Finally, naval military operations have sometimes interfered with the forag-
ing, reproduction, communication, and predator detection abilities of marine mammals, and have been 
linked to mass mortality events in some whale species. Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 456; L.E. 
Rendell & J.C.D. Gordon, Vocal Response of Long-Finned Pilot Whales (Globicephala Melas) to 
Military Sonar in the Ligurian Sea, 15 MARINE MAMMAL SCI. 198, 198 (2006). Naval operations that 
most often harm wildlife include the use of sonar, the testing of underwater munitions, and ship pro-
peller strikes. Id. 
 118 Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 456. 
 119 See Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059 (discussing the DoD’s stewardship of natural re-
sources on military lands). 
 120 Light, supra note 23, at 1775–76; About the Department of Defense, supra note 35. 
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DoD efforts may suggest that military and environmental protection objectives 
are less in conflict than many previously believed.121 
For instance, despite strong partisan divides in Congress over the exist-
ence of anthropogenic climate change, the DoD has unequivocally recognized 
climate change for almost a decade.122 The DoD’s recognition of climate 
change is based on the threat that it poses to national security.123 Specifically, 
DoD leaders acknowledge that the direct effects of climate change, such as se-
vere flooding, storms, and drought, have the potential to cause geopolitical in-
stability and conflict around the world in ways that affect the security interests of 
the United States.124 In recent years, the DoD has undertaken several energy ini-
tiatives such as reducing its reliance on fossil fuels and commercial electric 
grids, increasing the efficiency of the energy sources it currently consumes, 
and transitioning to renewable energy sources that lessen the logistical burden 
in combat.125 Although partly aimed at lowering the DoD’s financial expenses 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Light, supra note 23, at 1776, 1788 (arguing that the mutually-supporting military inter-
ests of protecting national security and reducing reliance on fossil fuels indicates that the military has 
a natural role to play in the development and growth of energy technologies); see also Light, supra 
note 6, at 879, 881, 884 (suggesting that, despite historic conceptions of the military as an environ-
mental polluter, its significant energy consumption creates an incentive to pursue renewable energy 
sources, benefiting both national security and the environment). 
 122 Light, supra note 23, at 1799; see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
(QDR) FACT SHEET 2 (2010); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2014, at 
8 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 QDR] (discussing the potential for the geopolitical effects of climate 
change to aggravate conditions around the world that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of 
violence); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2010, at 84–85 (2010) (explaining 
that although climate change does not directly cause global conflict, it may accelerate instability and 
conflict in those areas affected by flooding, water scarcity, and other consequences of climate 
change). 
 123 Light, supra note 6, at 918; see 2014 QDR, supra note 122, at 8 (discussing the challenges that 
climate change poses to the DoD’s operations around the world, and noting the potential for famine 
and rising sea levels to aggravate political disputes and lead to armed conflict). 
 124 Light, supra note 6, at 886 n.26, 918; see 2014 QDR, supra note 122, at 8 (describing the 
effects of climate change on resource scarcity as “threat multipliers”); see also Andrew Revkin, 
Trump’s Defense Secretary Cites Climate Change as National Security Challenge, PROPUBLICA 
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/trumps-defense-secretary-cites-climate-change-
national-security-challenge [https://perma.cc/XTM2-53GK] (providing statements made by former 
U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis in unpublished written testimony in advance of his Senate 
confirmation hearing, citing several examples of emerging areas of conflict caused by climate change 
that pose national security threats, such as the Russian Navy’s increased maritime access to newly-
opened (previously frozen) shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean, as well the second-order effects of 
rising sea levels flooding coastal DoD bases and desertification on inland DoD bases worldwide). See 
generally OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., & LOGISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., CLIMATE-RELATED RISK TO DOD INFRASTRUCTURE INITIAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
SURVEY (SLVAS) REPORT (2018), https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tab-b-
slvas-report-1-24-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7M9-CR3T] (surveying the negative effects that DoD 
installations have experienced due to extreme weather events and assessing threats posed by climate 
change to those installations’ operations and security). 
 125 Light, supra note 6, at 886. The DoD has pursued these energy initiatives based on several 
congressional mandates and authorizations. Id. at 907–09 & 908 nn.153–57; see, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. 
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and reducing the need for soldiers to provide security for dangerous fuel re-
supply missions in combat, these efforts act as “force multipliers” by further-
ing the military’s capabilities at little or no additional cost while simultaneous-
ly curbing climate change and reducing the threat of geopolitical instability in 
the long run.126 
Considering the historically destructive and direct impact of military ac-
tivity on natural ecosystems, arguably the most unexpected area of DoD envi-
ronmental protection is its responsible land stewardship on and around DoD 
bases.127 In its role as a land manager, the DoD has several self-interested poli-
cy reasons for acting as an effective manager of natural resources on military 
lands.128 Most of these reasons involve the DoD’s motivation to combat en-
croachment, or the cumulative effect of outside influences that place limita-
tions on normal military training and operations.129 This Part discusses the 
DoD’s adaptive solutions to its critical land management problems.130 Section 
A discusses the environment-related challenges that the DoD faces in its role 
as a land manager, focusing particularly on the problem of encroachment.131 
Section B of this Part describes several of the DoD’s most significant initia-
tives in natural resource management on DoD installations, such as its buffer-
                                                                                                                           
§ 2911(e)–(g) (West 2018) (directing the DoD to pursue opportunities to reduce its energy consump-
tion and to produce or procure from renewable sources at least 25% of the energy it consumes within 
its facilities by 2025); id. § 2912 (authorizing the DoD to reinvest half of its energy cost savings into 
additional conservation measures without further congressional appropriations); id. § 2916 (authoriz-
ing the DoD to sell to a utility company the electricity it produces from alternative or cogeneration 
facilities under the DoD’s jurisdiction, and to credit any proceeds to the appropriation account for the 
supply of electricity). See generally Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.  110-
140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8253–8259b (2012)) (providing 
additional financial incentives for the DoD to meet its energy objectives). Most significantly, the DoD 
is unique among federal agencies in its ability to enter into long-term (thirty-year) Power Purchase 
Agreements with alternative energy providers. Light, supra note 6, at 909; see 10 U.S.C.A. § 2922a 
(West 2018) (authorizing the DoD to enter into such contracts). In contrast, other agencies are limited 
to shorter contracts, which usually do not provide sufficient incentives for private financiers to invest 
in renewable energy projects, because they are unable to recover their initial investments in such short 
timelines. Light, supra note 6, at 909. 
 126 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND 
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1 (July 22, 2010), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/
Enhance-Energy-Security-MOU.pdf [http://perma.cc/9R2Z-KTPU] (explaining that higher energy 
efficiency can serve as a “force multiplier” for the military by increasing the range of forces in the 
field, reducing the amount of combat forces needed to protect fuel supply routes, and reducing the 
DoD’s long-term energy costs). 
 127 See Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059 (arguing that the DoD does not get enough recogni-
tion for its environmental stewardship programs on DoD lands). 
 128 See id. at 11,059–60 (explaining that the DoD’s exceptional environmental stewardship is 
related to its interest in preventing encroachment and reducing the need to develop alternative meth-
ods of military testing and training). 
 129 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54 (defining encroachment and discussing the DoD’s legal au-
thority to implement buffer programs to mitigate encroachment problems). 
 130 See infra notes 134–208 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 134–165 and accompanying text. 
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ing programs and compatible-use partnerships.132 Section C explains additional 
military policies and standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) that further indi-
cate the DoD’s commitment to responsible environmental stewardship.133 
A. The DoD’s Critical Land Management Problems:  
Encroachment as a Threat to Military Readiness 
The inherently close relationship between the military and the environ-
ment make land-use conflicts on and around DoD bases inevitable.134 The mili-
tary’s impact on the environment necessitates that federal laws limit the DoD’s 
activity on its own lands.135 Such legal restrictions, along with civilian activity 
that interferes with the military’s normal operations, can encroach upon the 
DoD’s ability to meet its training requirements as well as its everyday support 
and maintenance (“sustainment”) needs.136 The military characterizes en-
croachment as consisting of two main forms: the direct pressures from incom-
patible civilian development outside DoD bases and the land-use restrictions 
imposed by environmental laws and regulations.137 Both types worsen the ad-
ministrative burdens on the military, hinder military readiness, and increase the 
likelihood of litigation.138 
The DoD has a strong interest in preventing encroachment.139 The DoD’s 
ability to conduct realistic training, weapons testing, and routine sustainment 
operations is critical to its readiness to fight current and future national securi-
ty threats.140 Since the 1990s, encroachment has been increasingly problematic 
for the DoD because of the extensive and continuing land development and 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See infra notes 166–201 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 202–208 and accompanying text. 
 134 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 3–6 (providing an in-depth assessment of various 
land-use encroachment issues and environmental regulations that affect military readiness). 
 135 See Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 443 (discussing the effects of military actions on ecosys-
tems); see also THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 4–5 (describing the encroachments that result 
from ESA, CWA, and CAA restrictions). 
 136 See ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 74–78 (providing a detailed analysis of the types of encroach-
ment that hinder DoD activity). Forms of encroachment include, but are not limited to, limitations 
imposed by environmental laws, frequency spectrum interference, airspace restrictions, air quality 
hazards, frequent civilian noise complaints, light pollution from nearby civilian communities, and 
urban growth outside bases. Id. at 74, 76. 
 137 Babcock, supra note 16, at 126 n.105. 
 138 Id. at 126. 
 139 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 7–11 (discussing how encroachment specifically 
hurts the military’s effectiveness and impedes DoD operations). 
 140 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., READINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INTEGRATION PRO-
GRAM (REPI), 2019, 13TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2019), https://www.repi.mil/Portals/
44/2019_REPI_Report_to_Congress_FINAL.pdf?ver=2019-02-21-121034-590 [https://perma.cc/
RL9W-PWZQ] [hereinafter 2019 REPI REPORT]. 
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suburban sprawl near once-remote military bases.141 The top three land-use 
and encroachment challenges that DoD bases face are those related to noise,142 
runway “danger or safety zones,”143 and obscurants or obstacles directly be-
yond DoD fences.144 DoD installations often have multiple sources of en-
croachment, however, such as noise and light pollution, ESA and CAA re-
strictions, or competition for airspace and competition for radio frequencies.145 
Because encroachment often restricts the DoD’s testing, training, and sustain-
ment operations—most significantly by hindering military ground maneuvers 
(mounted and dismounted), live-fire weapons training (air-to-ground, artillery, 
and large caliber), and aircraft operations—encroachment can directly threaten 
military readiness and national security.146 
Regarding encroachment resulting from legal restrictions, each federal 
environmental law places some type of limit on how landowners utilize their 
land.147 Because DoD lands are home to hundreds of species that are listed as 
T&E under the ESA and MMPA, use of training areas by military units is often 
restrictedsometimes to a significant extentby these designations.148 For 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. at 4, 11, 16, 17 (explaining that over the last several decades, suburban and rural sprawl 
have dramatically increased and pushed civilian developments to the boundaries of once-remote mili-
tary installations). The habitat loss from this increase in civilian development historically resulted in 
thousands of wildlife species becoming federally listed as T&E; as human populations continue to 
spread onto all undeveloped land that is available, they continue to push remaining T&E wildlife onto 
undeveloped DoD lands, creating further restrictions on the military’s ability to use its land. Id. at 11. 
 142 Id. at 5 (noting that new civilian development outside of bases can force operational changes 
because of increased noise complaints). 
 143 Id. (suggesting that “danger or safety zones” at the end of runways must be kept clear of in-
compatible civilian development). 
 144 Id. (suggesting that tall structures, such as communications towers and wind turbines, can 
prevent or threaten safe flight operations and observation of surrounding areas outside DoD fences). 
 145 Id. at 4–5. In total, the Armed Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have identi-
fied eleven main encroachment issues: civilian complaints about noise pollution from bases, endan-
gered species listings and critical habitat designations, fragility of wetlands, threats to water quality 
and supply, threats to air pollution and quality, laws imposing restrictions on land-use near cultur-
al/historical resources, maritime competition, competition for airspace, competition for radio frequen-
cy spectrum, urban growth around military installations, and unexploded ordnance and remains of 
munitions on bases that are closing. Id. at 3. 
 146 2019 REPI REPORT, supra note 140, at 5; THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 7. DoD offi-
cials argue that encroachment affects these military operations in four main respects: by imposing 
operating and training restrictions, increasing operational costs for training exercises, causing com-
munity complaints, and degrading military readiness by necessitating training and testing worka-
rounds that inadequately prepare units for combat deployments. THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 
7. Although no official study has examined the quantifiable effects of all forms of encroachment on 
the DoD, in 2007, the Army stated that more than forty percent of its installations reported encroach-
ment issues. Id. at 7. 
 147 ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 83. 
 148 See id. at 74 (explaining that the FWS’s need to designate military lands as critical habitat for 
T&E wildlife species can reduce the military’s ability to use its training areas). The ESA requires the 
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations listing those species of animals that are considered 
“threatened” or “endangered” under certain criteria, and to designate specific land as “critical habitat” 
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example, in the early 1990s, at the U.S. Army’s Fort Bragg in North Carolina, 
airborne units were unable to use vast portions of forested training areas due to 
critical habitat designations established to protect the endangered red-cockaded 
woodpecker.149 State and federal listings of T&E wildlife species and critical 
habitat designations place some form of training restriction on every major 
military base in the United States.150 
The CWA also imposes several permitting and reporting requirements on 
federal installations, including DoD bases.151 Additionally, CAA regulations 
restrict activities that pollute the air and therefore restrict the military’s use of 
obscurant smoke and ground maneuvers (which produce air pollution in the 
form of stirred-up dust and diesel exhaust) on bad air quality days.152 DoD of-
ficials have asserted that provisions of CERCLA and the RCRA, which regu-
late solid waste disposal, hazardous waste management, and contamination of 
soil and groundwater, may also limit the DoD’s ability to use certain munitions 
                                                                                                                           
for those species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012). The ESA further requires that each federal agency “insure 
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary [of the Interior] 
. . . to be critical.” Id. § 1536(a)(2). The DOI’s jurisdiction to designate critical habitat extends to DoD 
lands. See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (authorizing the DOI to designate critical habitats generally). But see 
id. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(i) (providing that “[t]he Secretary [of the Interior] shall not designate as critical 
habitat any lands or other geographical areas owned or controlled by the Department of Defense, or 
designated for its use, that are subject to an integrated natural resources management plan prepared 
[by DoD base commanders and FWS officials] under [the Sikes Act] . . . .” and thus, if a DoD base 
has already worked with the FWS to establish a plan for the conservation and recovery of a given 
threatened or endangered species on the base, the DOI is precluded from designating that land as criti-
cal habitat). 
 149 RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54–55. 
 150 Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,061; see THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that 
the ESA T&E listing of two bird species resulted in 66,000 acres, or about 33%, of the training land 
on Fort Hood, Texas, becoming designated as critical habitat, thus precluding almost all military ac-
tivity in that area). 
 151 THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 4–5. Because the CWA “precludes the alteration and 
destruction of wetlands” and “requires special review and permits for developments and other activi-
ties in wetlands,” military bases with wetlands—such as Fort Stewart, Georgia—may be limited in 
their training and sustainment operations on such wetlands. Id.; see Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (2012) (providing permit requirements for dredged or fill material in the nation’s waterways, 
including wetlands). Similarly, the CWA “impose[s] various permitting, reporting, and operational 
restrictions on installations because of clean water concerns, which can influence testing and training 
operations. For example, tank training can cause significant erosion problems, affecting nearby stream 
and river water quality.” THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 5. 
 152 ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 76; e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7404, 7408, 7412-13, 7418 
(2012) (applying the CAA to fuels and vehicles, providing control standards and enforcement mecha-
nisms for air quality and pollution from federal facilities, and listing specific types of hazardous air 
pollutants); see POTOMAC-HUDSON ENG’G, INC., PIÑON CANON MANEUVER SITE (PCMS) TRAINING 
AND OPERATIONS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS) (2015), https://www.carson.
army.mil/assets/docs/dpw/NEPA/2014-pcms-training-and-operations-final-eis.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5DX7-8Y57] (noting the potential long-term air quality impacts of “increased vehicle exhaust and 
fugitive dust from maneuvers” on the Army’s Piñon Canon Maneuver Site in Colorado). 
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and petroleum fuels.153 Finally, under the National Historic Preservation Act, 
the DoD is required to help preserve cultural resources on its bases, such as 
cemeteries, archaeological sites, and historic buildings, which further reduces 
its available training lands.154 
Certain types of normal civilian activity interfere more directly with near-
by DoD operations.155 Urban growth outside of military installations generally 
results in commercial or residential land use that is incompatible with DoD 
activities.156 For instance, commercial airports near DoD bases increase air-
space congestion and restrict the military’s ability to conduct routine logistical 
operations and pilot training.157 Additionally, the expanding commercial use of 
cellular phones creates pressure from the telecommunications industry to real-
locate segments of the radio frequency spectrum from federal to non-federal 
                                                                                                                           
 153 ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 74; see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601–9675 (providing control standards for 
hazardous waste releases, liability, and compensation); see Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012) (providing federal standards for hazardous waste man-
agement); see also Impact of Military Training on the Environment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Env’t & Pub. Works, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Dan Miller, First Assistant Attorney General, 
Colorado Department of Law) (discussing one citizen suit in Alaska, which “allege[d] that the dis-
charge of ordnance onto an operational military range constitutes ‘disposal’ under RCRA and a ‘re-
lease’ under CERCLA,” and the DoD’s conclusion in that case that “if used or fired military muni-
tions are considered statutory solid wastes under RCRA, or hazardous substances under CERCLA, the 
inevitable consequence will be that states will impose remedial requirements that will conflict with 
military readiness” by preventing live-fire training on the base’s ranges during corrective action or 
remediation). Contra Impact of Military Training on the Environment, supra (contending a lack of 
knowledge of “any instance in which RCRA, CERCLA or the Clean Air Act has ever caused an ad-
verse impact on military readiness” by preventing a military training exercise); Military Munitions 
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 6622, 6632 (Feb. 12, 1997) (interpreting the RCRA to characterize fired munitions 
(as opposed to emplaced munitions) that are used for their intended purpose as “statutory” solid waste 
but not “regulatory” solid waste, and therefore not subject to the full array of RCRA permit and man-
agement requirements). Regarding military munitions, the “EPA’s major regulatory concern is [‘Mu-
nitions Response Areas/Sites’] that were former ranges and sites where the industrial activity may 
have ceased and [Munitions and Explosives of Concern (‘MEC’)] and munitions constituents may be 
present.” EPA, HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF MUNITIONS RESPONSE ACTIONS, INTERIM 
FINAL 1-1 (2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/9530610.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S8UM-8NQK]. The EPA uses the term MEC to refer to “specific categories of military 
munitions that may pose unique explosives safety risks, [such as]: (1) Unexploded ordnance (UXO); 
(2) Discarded military munitions (DMM); or (3) Munitions Constituents (e.g. TNT, RDX) present in 
high enough concentrations to pose an explosive hazard. Formerly known as Ordnance and Explo-
sives (OE).” Id. at xix. See generally The Environmental Challenge of Military Munitions and Federal 
Facilities, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/environmental-challenge-military-munitions-and-
federal-facilities [https://perma.cc/ME39-YHSL] (discussing the EPA’s regulatory authority and his-
torical treatment of RCRA and CERCLA provisions in response to DoD munitions use). 
 154 THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 5; see 54 U.S.C.A. §§ 306101(a), 306102 (mandating that 
federal agencies establish procedures to preserve historic and cultural sites within their jurisdictions). 
 155 See ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 74, 76 (describing various direct sources of encroachment by 
civilian activity outside DoD bases). 
 156 THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 8. 
 157 ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 74. 
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control, thereby reducing available military frequencies.158 Noise complaints 
from civilian communities near sometimes-loud military bases also pose a 
constant source of pressure on installation commanders to restrict their training 
and testing activities to certain times and durations.159 Finally, for those DoD 
bases that are close to urban populations, light pollution from nearby homes 
and businesses often makes military night-vision training, which requires al-
most complete darkness, difficult or impossible to conduct.160 When these 
types of encroachment problems become too great, they can result in the clo-
sure of military installations.161 For instance, in 1995, largely in response to 
constant noise complaints from the San Diego community, the DoD closed 
Naval Air Station Miramar, later converting it into Marine Corps Air Station 
Miramar, and relocated the Navy’s F-14 squadrons and “Top Gun” program to 
more remote bases across the country.162 
In response to these numerous encroachment pressures from both the pub-
lic and private sector, the DoD often adjusts its activities to resolve such ten-
sions.163 Many individual base commanders employ so-called “good neighbor” 
techniques to find other ways to conduct necessary training within their land-
use limitations.164 Some political and military leaders believe that the aggre-
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. The telecommunications and wind power industries also construct tall towers, which can 
restrict the flight paths of military aircraft if the towers are too near to DoD bases. Id. at 74, 76. 
 159 THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 4, 7–8; see Minimizing Encroachment and Incompatible Land 
Use Near Military Installations, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2013), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/minimize-encroachment-on-military-installations.
aspx [https://perma.cc/6Y3P-R887] (discussing legislative methods of mitigating conflict between 
military and civilian land use, including state laws that require local communities around DoD bases 
to communicate with bases about land-use planning to help reduce civil-military tensions from en-
croachment sources such as civilian noise complaints). Although military weapon systems are exempt 
from the Noise Control Act of 1972, pressures from communities outside DoD installations often seek 
to restrict or reduce military training due to noise. ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 74; see Noise Control 
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4902(3)(B)(i) (2012) (excluding military weapons or equipment from the 
Noise Control Act’s definition of applicable noise “products”); see, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, MILITARY TRAINING: DOD LACKS A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO MANAGE ENCROACHMENT 
ON TRAINING RANGES 10, 11 (2002) (explaining how community noise complaints restricted training 
operations on both Fort Lewis and Nellis Air Force Base). Even at DoD bases in other countries, the 
most common complaint from nearby civilian populations is the noise from military training. See 
Mark Landler, Germans Near Air Base Don’t Hate U.S., Just the Noise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/world/germans-near-air-base-don-t-hate-us-just-the-noise.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z64Y-BCNV]. 
 160 THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 10. 
 161 See id. at 8 (discussing the Navy’s closure of NAS Miramar (San Diego, CA) in 1995 and its 
need to relocate the base’s F-14 squadrons and Top Gun Program to Florida mostly because of civil-
ian noise complaints). 
 162 Id. 
 163 ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 77. 
 164 Id. 
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gate effect of these workarounds is the diminished capability of DoD leaders to 
adequately prepare their forces to deter war and protect national security.165 
B. Adaptive Solutions: The DoD’s Innovative Land Management Initiatives 
Starting in the 1990s, several creative initiatives demonstrated to the DoD 
that the most effective way to prevent encroachment on military installations 
was to seek the preservation of nearby undeveloped lands to use as “buffer 
zones” between bases and nearby civilian property.166 Military installations use 
buffers to shield neighboring civilian communities from their sometimes-
dangerous operations, such as weapons testing.167 Buffer zones are also meant 
to mitigate interference from civilian activities that inhibit the DoD’s opera-
tions, such as when nearby commercial runways obstruct military flight pat-
terns.168 
In 1995, to combat the encroachment from ESA restrictions at Fort Bragg 
due to the endangered species of woodpecker on the base, the Army estab-
lished an experimental partnership between Army leaders, a charitable envi-
ronmental organization, and private landowners around the base.169 The part-
nership successfully eliminated military training restrictions on the base by 
coordinating the purchase of land interests nearby to preserve off-base critical 
habitats for the endangered bird species.170 In 2002, following this program’s 
success, the DoD successfully requested that Congress enact 10 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Id. These workaround procedures generally take the following forms in the training and testing 
context: reductions in training frequency or duration; changes to the locations of training exercises; 
reductions in the size of exercises; mandatory segmentation of forces into smaller elements; adminis-
trative halts in training exercises; unrealistic training; increased reliance on simulations (such as simu-
lating the use of obscurant smoke); and limits on task execution (only permitting soldiers to perform 
part of training tasks). Id. at 77–78. Specific examples of these workarounds include declining to use 
obscurant smoke, limiting the digging of foxholes, altering runway approaches for aircraft, avoiding 
movements in armored vehicles, discontinuing nighttime or weekend training, and avoiding training 
in certain areas during nesting season for an endangered species. Id. at 78. 
 166 Id. at 85; see RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54–55 (discussing the Army’s experimental buffer 
program at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which began in 1995). Although buffers are often some type 
of land feature, such as a large undeveloped property, a row of trees, or a body of water, they can also 
exist in a merely technical sense, such as lines on a map. ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 85. The most 
common feature of buffers, however, is that they are generally devoid of human population. Id. 
 167 ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 85; RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54. 
 168 See ELWOOD, supra note 24, at 85–86 (explaining that a buffer zone is any designated area, on 
or off a military base, that is used to mitigate the negative effects of military and civilian activities on 
one another). 
 169 RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54; see supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the ESA 
listing of the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker, many of which lived on the Army’s Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina, severely restricting training on the base). The environmental charity that the Army 
partnered with was The Nature Conservancy, whose mission is to “conserve the lands and waters on 
which all life depends.” RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54. See generally The Nature Conservancy, https://
www.nature.org/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/7JBL-FG2E] (describing the work of The Nature Conservancy). 
 170 RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54–55. 
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§ 2684a, which authorizes DoD installations to enter into similar long-term 
cooperative agreements with state and local government agencies, conserva-
tion-focused nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and private landown-
ers.171 Specifically, this authority allows the DoD to enter into cost-sharing 
agreements with such interested stakeholders to purchase land interests and 
support conservation efforts on those lands.172 These agreements often result in 
those stakeholders purchasing the land with financial support from the DoD, 
which receives a restrictive easement on the land in return, allowing the DoD 
to place legal limits on the future use of the land.173 These partnerships are de-
signed to accomplish three main objectives: reduce ESA restrictions and en-
croachment on military operations, protect critical habitat for T&E wildlife 
species near DoD lands, and promote compatible land use by neighboring pri-
                                                                                                                           
 171 10 U.S.C.A. § 2684a (West 2018) (providing mechanisms for the DoD to enter into cost-
sharing agreements with state and local governments and conservation organizations); 2019 REPI 
REPORT, supra note 140, at 2; see also Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 670c-1 (West 2014) (authorizing the 
DoD to provide for the maintenance or improvement of natural resources on or beyond installation 
boundaries). In addition to 10 U.S.C. § 2684a, the key statutory authority for the DoD’s buffer efforts 
is the Sikes Act. See Legislative History of the Sikes Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Oct. 16, 
2015), https://www.fws.gov/fisheries/sikes_act/sikes_act_history.html [https://perma.cc/3YAR-EZR6] 
(providing a brief legislative history of the Sikes Act); Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,061 (dis-
cussing the usefulness of the 2011 Sikes Act amendment in permitting the DoD to use funds to im-
plement natural resource conservation projects off base). Enacted in 1960, the Sikes Act was original-
ly designed to enable the DoD to manage hunting and fishing permits on military installations and 
merely authorized the DoD to cooperate with the DOI and state agencies “in planning, development, 
and managing fish and wildlife resources on military reservation[s] throughout the United States.” 
Legislative History of the Sikes Act, supra; see Sikes Act, Pub. L. No. 86-797 (1960). In 1997, Con-
gress enacted the Sikes Act Improvement Act, which directed the DoD to coordinate with the FWS to 
develop integrated natural resources management plans and other strategies to conserve wildlife on its 
lands. Sikes Act Improvement Act of 1997 § 2904(a), Pub. L. No. 105-85 (1997); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 
& U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLANS 1 (2004), 
https://www.fws.gov/fisheries/sikes_act/documents/INRMP%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
76BQ-8X8R]. Most recently, in 2014, Congress amended the Sikes Act to authorize the DoD to fund 
off-base natural resource management projects and to enter into eighteen-month agreements with 
other federal agencies, states, local governments, Indian tribes, NGOs, and individuals without the 
need for the DoD to purchase a land interest (either outright purchase of the title or purchase of a 
restrictive-use easement). National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291 
(2014); see 10 U.S.C.A. § 2684a(h) (“Interagency Cooperation in Conservation Programs to Avoid or 
Reduce Adverse Impacts on Military Readiness Activities”); 16 U.S.C.A. § 670c-1 (“The Sikes Act”); 
Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,061 (discussing the DoD’s authority under the Sikes Act and 10 
U.S.C.A. § 2684a to enter into cooperative partnerships with off-base public and private actors for 
purposes related to conservation and reduction of encroachment). 
 172 2019 REPI REPORT, supra note 140, at 2; see 10 U.S.C.A. § 2684a(d) (“Acquisition and Ac-
ceptance of Property and Interests”); see also 2019 REPI REPORT, supra note 140, at 2 (noting that, in 
2018, “Congress expanded the [10 U.S.C.] 2684a authority in the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 (2018) to include agreements that 
enhance or improve military installation resilience”). 
 173 2019 REPI REPORT, supra note 140, at 2. 
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vate landowners.174 Additionally, pursuant to its authority under the Sikes Act 
of 1960, the DoD coordinates with partners to fund off-base natural resource 
management projects, which subsequently allows the DoD to receive “recov-
ery credit” from the FWS; such credits relieve the land-use restrictions that 
ESA listings would otherwise impose on DoD bases.175 
The DoD administers its power to enter into cooperative agreements and 
fund buffer programs through the REPI program.176 The REPI program pro-
vides funding for each of the DoD Military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marine Corps) to establish buffer partnerships on individual installations 
with conservation NGOs and state and local governments to share the expenses 
of acquiring land interests from willing sellers—either in outright land pur-
chases (fee simple title) or in binding restrictions on the owner’s use of the 
land (restrictive use conservation easements).177 For example, through the Ar-
my Compatible Use Buffer (“ACUB”) program, the Army’s implementation of 
its REPI authority, an Army installation and its buffer partners enter into an 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See id. (discussing the purposes of buffering partnerships); Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 
11,061 (describing the goals of cooperative buffering partnerships and giving examples of such part-
nerships); see also 10 U.S.C.A. § 2684a(a) (authorizing cooperative agreements for compatible-use 
and conservation purposes); 16 U.S.C.A. § 670c-1(a) (authorizing the DoD to enter into cooperative 
and interagency agreements and to fund conservation projects for land management purposes on mili-
tary installations). 
 175 See Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,061 (discussing the DoD’s pilot program of coordinat-
ing with the FWS to earn “recovery credits” which allowed the DoD to disregard ESA restrictions at 
Fort Hood, Texas). The DoD and the FWS originally developed the “recovery credit” system at Fort 
Hood, Texas, under which the Army was able to accrue credits by advancing the recovery of the en-
dangered golden-cheeked warbler off-base by executing conservation contracts with nearby landown-
ers. 73 Fed. Reg. 44,761, 44,762 (July 31, 2008); Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,061. In contrast to 
purchasing restrictive-use conservation easements, entering into such conservation contracts was 
much more cost-effective for this credit system; after earning sufficient credits through these recovery 
efforts, the base officials were able to offset any temporary adverse effects of military training on the 
endangered bird species on Fort Hood. 73 Fed. Reg. at 44762; Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,061. 
 176 2019 REPI Report, supra note 140, at 2. 
 177 About REPI, READINESS & ENVTL. PROT. INTEGRATION, http://www.repi.mil/About-REPI/
Frequently-Asked-Questions/ [https://perma.cc/UTX3-WWNE]; Service Programs, READINESS & 
ENVTL. PROT. INTEGRATION, http://www.repi.mil/Buffer-Projects/Service-Programs/ [https://perma.
cc/PV69-UJAL]. Although the U.S. Coast Guard is considered a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, it 
is part of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) rather than the DoD; thus, it is not empow-
ered by the DoD’s REPI program. See generally U.S. COAST GUARD, https://www.uscg.mil/ [https://
perma.cc/Q4HS-EG29] (noting the Coast Guard’s parent organization as the DHS). Nevertheless, be-
cause marine environmental protection is one of the Coast Guard’s eleven statutory missions, it too im-
plements a program focused on environmental protection efforts. See 6 U.S.C.A. § 468(a)(1)(E) (West 
2018) (listing “[m]arine environmental protection” as one of the Coast Guard’s eleven statutory “[n]on-
homeland security missions”); Marine Environmental Protection, GOCOASTGUARD, https://www.go
coastguard.com/about-the-coast-guard/discover-our-roles-missions/marine-environmental-protection 
[https://perma.cc/H6PS-V3KB] (explaining that, “[t]hrough the Marine Environmental Protection 
Program, the Coast Guard develops and enforces regulations to avert the introduction of invasive 
species into the maritime environment, stop unauthorized ocean dumping, and prevent oil and chemi-
cal spills”).  
1056 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1023 
agreement requiring both sides to share the costs to purchase a land interest in 
areas outside of a base, but the partner receives the land interest from the sell-
er.178 In return for their resulting title in the land interest and ability to use the 
land for certain predetermined purposes (such as for livestock grazing or pub-
lic outdoor recreation), the ACUB partner is required to maintain some desig-
nated portion or all of the land and enforce the restrictive use easements; the 
Army, in turn, reserves the right to transfer the partner’s interest to another eli-
gible entity if the partner fails to fulfill its obligations.179 The impact of these 
buffering partnerships has been significant: since 2003, the REPI program has 
enabled the DoD to collaborate with its partners to contribute over $1.6 billion 
toward buffering and natural resource management efforts, protecting more 
than 580,000 total acres of land in the thirty-three states that are home to the 
DoD’s 106 partnership locations.180 
                                                                                                                           
 178 RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 55; see Service Programs, supra note 177 (explaining that the 
ACUB partner, rather than the Army, acquires the land interest from the landowner); see also Cruden 
et al., supra note 18, at 11,060 (noting that the military base itself does not actually receive the land 
interest from the landowner in most cases, but instead contracts with the buffering partner to purchase 
and preserve the land); Compatible Use Buffer Program (CUB), U.S. ARMY ENVTL. COMMAND, 
https://www.aec.army.mil/index.php?cID=329 [https://perma.cc/VJK7-9ZCQ] (explaining the process 
by which an Army base can contribute funds to an ACUB partner’s purchase of easements or real 
property from willing landowners to preserve valuable habitats and reduce incompatible development 
near military installations). Although the procedure to establish a conservation easement on buffer 
lands varies with each military service, partnership, and local real estate situation, the typical process 
involves the DoD installation and its partners contributing funds, usually in equal amounts, to enable a 
land conservation trust organization to purchase land or land interests. CUB Fact Sheet, supra note 25, 
at 1. In return, the military base generally obtains a restrictive use easement or other guarantees that 
the property will forever be protected from incompatible use, such as a requirement that landowners 
must notify the DoD of proposed development or changes to land use on or near buffer areas. Id. But 
see RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 55 (noting that, in contrast to the Navy and Marine Corps, which have 
similar encroachment partnering (“EP”) buffering programs to those of the Army, the Air Force is the 
service least affected by encroachment, so it instead focuses on partnering with local governments 
outside of Air Force bases to develop compatible land-use and zoning plans). 
 179 Service Programs, supra note 177. Because these agreements generally result in restrictive 
land-use easements rather than outright purchases, the DoD and other interested stakeholders have 
several protections. MAJ Gary Arasin (U.S. Air Force), Compatible Use Buffer Program Proves Pow-
erful Tool for Army Installations, NAT’L GUARD BUREAU (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.nationalguard.
mil/News/Article-View/Article/574408/compatible-use-buffer-program-proves-powerful-tool-for-
army-installations/ [https://perma.cc/SFW4-26PS]. For instance, under these agreements, partners 
must continually monitor the lands, the restrictive easements transfer to new owners if the land is sold, 
and the military service that entered into the cooperative agreement may sometimes retain reversion-
ary rights to allow the DoD to transfer title in the land to another partner. Id. These compatible use 
buffer agreements thus allow the DoD to effectively encumber large buffer areas adjoining installa-
tions to provide lasting habitat preservation and protection of military training and operations. Id.  For 
an example of a map diagram of an ACUB, see Army Compatible Use Buffer (ACUB) Program, Fort 
Indiantown Gap National Guard Training Center (FTIG), DMVA, https://www.dmva.pa.gov/
dmvaoffices/Environmental-Resources/Pages/Army-Compatible-Use-Buffer-(ACUB)-Program.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UC7Q-G8PG]. 
 180 See 2019 REPI Report, supra note 140, at 2–3 (providing data for REPI accomplishments 
through fiscal year 2018); see also id. at 4–5 (discussing the recent example of Hill Air Force Base in 
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The REPI program has also provided the framework for the DoD to estab-
lish larger-scale collaborations with several federal and state entities—as well 
as public and private ones— across entire regions of the country.181 In 2013, 
the DoD used this framework to ally with the DOI and USDA to establish the 
Sentinel Landscapes Partnership (“Sentinel Landscapes”).182 Through Sentinel 
Landscapes, the three agencies coordinate with state, local, and private part-
ners to develop mutually beneficial strategies to preserve lands that are im-
portant both to local communities and to national security.183 This program is 
the first nationwide collaboration between federal agencies and various state, 
local, and private organizations to protect national security, promote natural 
resource sustainability, and support compatible land uses such as ranching, 
farming, forestry, public recreation, and conservation in areas surrounding mil-
itary installations.184 
The three goals of Sentinel Landscapes are to preserve working and agri-
cultural lands (ranches, forests, and farms), to restore and protect critical wild-
life habitat, and to ensure military readiness.185 From the DoD’s perspective, 
these types of collaborations prevent or eliminate restrictions on military oper-
ations that would otherwise result from incompatible civilian development 
near bases by rewarding neighboring property owners who use land manage-
                                                                                                                           
Utah, home to the Air Force’s F-35 jet training program, to demonstrate the positive effects of REPI 
efforts between DoD and outside partners). 
 181 About REPI, READINESS & ENVTL. PROT. INTEGRATION, http://www.repi.mil/About-REPI/
Frequently-Asked-Questions/ [https://perma.cc/467W-LWCV]. 
 182 Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., SENTINEL LANDSCAPES, www.sentinellandscapes.org/
media/1232/value_of_sl_factsheet_120916.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5U4-XXBR] [hereinafter SENTI-
NEL LANDSCAPES] (providing background information on Sentinel Landscapes). As of December 
2018, there were seven designated Sentinel Landscapes: Joint Base Lewis-McChord (WA), Eastern 
North Carolina (NC), Fort Huachuca (AZ), Camp Riley (MN), Avon Park Air Force Range (FL), 
Middle Chesapeake (MD, DE, and VA), and Georgia (GA). Explore, SENTINEL LANDSCAPES, http://
sentinellandscapes.org/explore/ [https://perma.cc/E8NM-HKK9] (providing updated information on 
the Partnership’s locations). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., SENTINEL LANDSCAPES 
2016 REPORT (2016), https://sentinellandscapes.org/media/1184/sentinel_landscapes_2016_report_
final_12dec16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7QX-WZJS] [hereinafter SENTINEL LANDSCAPES 2016 RE-
PORT] (providing data on each of the seven Sentinel Landscapes). 
 183 See SENTINEL LANDSCAPES 2016 REPORT, supra note 182, at 3–4 (explaining that the Sentinel 
Landscapes program protects valuable landscapes, anchored by a military base or testing range, to 
unite the shared land-use interests of various organizations); see also SENTINEL LANDSCAPES, supra 
note 182 (describing how the Sentinel Landscapes Partnership collaborations are designed to identify 
shared interests among several stakeholders and employ strategies to protect habitats and working 
lands while reducing restrictions on military operations, thereby benefitting national security, local 
economies, and natural resource conservation efforts). 
 184 Interview with Dreher, supra note 22; see SENTINEL LANDSCAPES, supra note 182 (discussing 
accomplishments of the Sentinel Landscapes Partnership). 
 185 JENNIFER SCHULTZ, MILITARY AFFAIRS, SENTINEL LANDSCAPES: A NEW PARTNERSHIP 
TARGETS THE LAND AROUND MILITARY BASES 2 (2015), https://sentinellandscapes.org/media/1042/
ncsl-sentinel-landscapes-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFJ6-BN5A]; see SENTINEL LANDSCAPES, supra 
note 182. 
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ment practices that conserve natural resources and maintain buffer areas be-
tween civilian and military activity.186 The partnership accomplishes this using 
various mechanisms, such as pooling contributions for investments (to protect 
and restore privately owned land around bases) and legal tools, such as acquir-
ing voluntary conservation easements and establishing management endow-
ments.187 Between 2013 and 2018, the partnership designated seven separate 
Sentinel Landscapes partnerships across the country, which consist of thou-
sands of governmental agencies, NGOs, and private landowners, including ten 
major military installations and approximately eighty smaller bases across the 
United States.188 In total, Sentinel Landscapes have protected or restored more 
than 130,000 acres of land outside military bases through outright purchases, 
conservation easements, and other legal mechanisms.189 
In addition to its buffering efforts, the DoD is also one of only a handful 
of federal agencies to provide funding for research in the fields of wildlife con-
servation and pollution management.190 In 1990, Congress created the Legacy 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See SCHULTZ, supra note 185, at 2 (explaining that Sentinel Landscapes are “win-win” part-
nerships because they protect working farmlands, preserve wildlife habitat, and promote military 
readiness). 
 187 Id. at 3. 
 188 See id. at 2 (providing data on the DoD installations included in the Sentinel Landscapes Part-
nership). 
 189 See SENTINEL LANDSCAPES 2016 REPORT, supra note 182, at 5–12 (providing data on the 
total acres of land protected, conserved, and restored by each Sentinel Landscape as of 2016). Since 
2013, these partnerships have set aside over 20,000 acres of critical forests, deserts, wetlands, and 
other habitats for permanent conservation, restored over 100,000 acres of working lands and prevent-
ed those lands from becoming commercially developed, and protected hundreds of species of endan-
gered, threatened, and at-risk wildlife. See id. at 2–6 (providing data for accomplishments of each of 
the seven Sentinel Landscapes as of 2016); see also 2019 REPI REPORT, supra note 140, at 4 (discuss-
ing other accomplishments of the seven Sentinel Landscapes as of 2018). 
 190 Telephone Interview with Ya-Wei Li, Dir., Ctr. for Conservation Innovation (CCI), Defs. of 
Wildlife (Feb. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Interview with Li]; see Federal Agencies Programs, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/federal-agency-
programs.html [https://perma.cc/CTB5-ZSJ2] (listing the six federal agencies that are involved in 
wildlife species conservation, including the DoD); see also About SERDP, SERDP-ESTCP, https://
www.serdp-estcp.org/About-SERDP-and-ESTCP/About-SERDP [https://perma.cc/B9ME-JA2A] 
(discussing the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (“SERDP”), the DoD’s 
environmental science and technology research program that provides competitive research grants); 
U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program, U.S. NAVY, http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Pacific/
technology/Pages/mammals.aspx [https://perma.cc/KN8T-MV7S] (discussing the Navy Marine 
Mammal Program (“NMMP”)). Although not a distinctly conservation-focused initiative, the NMMP 
is a program administered by the Navy which studies the potential military use of marine mammals 
and trains animals to perform tasks such as ship and harbor protection, mine detection and clearance, 
and equipment recovery. Id.; see William Gasperini, Uncle Sam’s Dolphins, SMITHSONIAN MAG. 
(Sept. 2003), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/uncle-sams-dolphins-89811585 [https://
perma.cc/JM3Z-8MLB] (discussing the success of the NMMP’s mine-clearance work in Iraq). But see 
U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program, SCIENCE DAILY, https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/u.s._
navy_marine_mammal_program.htm [https://perma.cc/N5KN-J4EY] (discussing the controversial 
nature of the NMMP). Despite its primary mission of supporting naval military operations, the pro-
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Resource Management Program (“Legacy”), which provides financial assis-
tance to the DoD for installation-specific efforts to preserve natural resources 
and conduct wildlife studies.191 Using these funds and its REPI authority, the 
DoD offers competitive awards to NGOs to fund research on natural resource 
management.192 For example, the DoD recently awarded Legacy project funds 
to Defenders of Wildlife, which allowed the NGO to collaborate with the FWS 
to develop the first web-based recovery plan for a listed species (in this case, 
the eastern indigo snake), using GPS technology to track current populations 
of endangered species.193 The benefit of these types of projects is two-fold: 
                                                                                                                           
gram has also played a significant role in marine mammal research and conservation. See Dorian S. 
Houser et al., Research with Navy Marine Mammals Benefits Animal Care, Conservation and Biology, 
23 INT’L J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 249, 250 (2010) (“Future and current work conducted by the [N]MMP 
will continue to add to the knowledge base of marine mammal biology while contributing to their care 
and conservation. . . . Over the 48+ years the MMP has been in existence, a plethora of research pro-
jects investigating marine mammal health, physiology, behavior, biosonar, and diving have been 
completed. The program has generated over 1000 research articles in its history . . . , making it one of 
the largest contributors to the knowledge of marine mammals in the world.”). 
 191 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat 1856 (1990); DoD 
Legacy Resource Management Program, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. ENV’T, SAFETY, & OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH NETWORK & INFO. EXCH., https://www.denix.osd.mil/nr/legacy/progfactsheets/fact-sheets/
department-of-defense-legacy-resource-management-program-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/6EBU-
TWDH]. 
 192 DoD Legacy Resource Management Program, supra note 191. 
 193 Interview with Li, supra note 190. Recovery of T&E species is “the process of restoring en-
dangered and threatened species to the point where they no longer require the safeguards of the En-
dangered Species Act. A recovery plan serves as a road map for species recovery.” Recovery of Spe-
cies Under the Endangered Species Act, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.
fisheries.noaa.gov/national/endangered-species-conservation/recovery-species-under-endangered-
species-act [https://perma.cc/Q4PV-3GF3]. Although not a regulatory document, a species survival 
plan is generally a document that provides “detailed site-specific management actions for private, 
Tribal, federal, and state cooperation in conserving listed species and their ecosystems.” U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (Feb. 2017), https://www.fws.gov/
endangered/esa-library/pdf/RPI-Feb2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/84GF-Z6SW]. Although most survival 
plans are outdated and reviewed only every five years, the Defenders of Wildlife’s online, interactive 
recovery tool uses geospatial mapping technology to dynamically track the recoveries of at-risk, 
threatened, and endangered species across the United States. Interview with Li, supra note 190. The 
innovation of the plan that the DoD financed was further described as follows: 
The outdated recovery plan for the eastern indigo snake is not an anomaly. The median 
ESA recovery plan is over 20 years old, and every plan to-date is a static hard copy 
document. Additionally, one quarter of listed species have no recovery plan. Natural re-
sources managers can maximize opportunities by integrating up-to-date information in-
to recovery plans to inform conservation management and decisions. Modernizing spe-
cies recovery plans facilitates communication and information sharing, making species 
management more adaptive and cost effective. . . . The core recovery plan, which will 
be a 10- to 15-page document laying out the recovery criteria, estimated cost, and time-
line, will remain static once the public has commented on it, but will be readily availa-
ble in web format. The other components of the recovery plan, the Species Status As-
sessment (SSA) and the Recovery Implementation Strategy (RIS), are dynamic, and 
will change as new information is added. 
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providing research for conserving wildlife species around the world and allow-
ing the DoD to prevent encroachment due to further ESA listing of wildlife on 
DoD lands.194 Similarly, to develop strategies to reduce pollution from solid 
waste sources, grey water, and hazardous waste, the DoD funds research pro-
grams through its Strategic Environmental Research and Development Pro-
gram, with oversight and policy guidance from the EPA and U.S. Department 
of Energy.195 
By employing the previously discussed land management initiatives, the 
DoD has applied existing, but mostly ignored, provisions within the ESA to 
meet the dual aims of reducing encroachment and protecting endangered spe-
cies.196 All federal organizations generally comply with section 7(a)(2) of the 
ESA, which requires that agencies ensure, in consultation with either or both 
the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), that any pro-
posed action “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endan-
gered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse mod-
ification of habitat” designated as critical.197 The DoD is one of the only agen-
cies, however, that proactively fulfills the mandate and legislative vision of 
section 7(a)(1), which requires federal agencies to further the purpose of the 
ESA by proactively carrying out conservation programs to recovernot mere-
ly maintainT&E species’ populations within the agencies’ lands.198 The DoD 
                                                                                                                           
Jacob Malcom & Ya-Wei Li, Dynamic Recovery Plan Documents for Improved Regulatory Efficiency 
and Conservation Outcomes, in DEP’T OF DEF. NAT. RES. PROGRAM, NATURAL SELECTIONS 4, 4–5 
(2018), https://www.denix.osd.mil/nr/resources/program-information/newsletters1/newsletter/2018/
summer-2018-threatened-endangered-and-at-risk-species/ [https://perma.cc/2P5P-E524]. 
 194 Interview with Li, supra note 190; see Legacy Resource Management Program, supra note 
191 (explaining that the DoD’s natural resources projects under the Legacy Program serve to support 
military readiness and enhance conservation efforts). 
 195 See generally About SERDP, supra note 190 (contending that the “development and application 
of innovative environmental technologies will reduce the costs, environmental risks, and time required to 
resolve environmental problems while, at the same time, enhancing and sustaining military readiness”); 
SERDP Solicitations, SERDP-ESTCP, https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Funding-Opportunities/SERDP-
Solicitations [https://perma.cc/RK5E-WZBJ] (providing details on SERDP’s competitive funds for 
environmental research and development projects). 
 196 Interview with Li, supra note 190. 
 197 See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (requiring federal 
agencies to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the de-
struction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the [DOI] Secretary 
. . . to be critical”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE MILITARY AND THE EN-
DANGERED SPECIES ACT: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 1–2 (Sept. 2001), https://www.fws.gov/
endangered/esa-library/pdf/military_esa_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG5F-MBMR] [hereinafter 
MILITARY & ESA FACT SHEET] (explaining the provisions of section 7(a) of the ESA); Interview with 
Li, supra note 190 (discussing the DoD’s innovation in compliance with section 7(a)(1) of the ESA). 
 198 See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Re-
defining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 
1111 (1995) (“The only construction that fulfills Congress’s original legislative vision and harmonizes 
section 7(a)(1) with the other ESA provisions is that section 7(a)(1) imposes on all federal agencies a 
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has fulfilled this obligation, in particular, through the previously discussed co-
operative partnerships, its Legacy grant projects to fund wildlife research, and 
its buffering programs that preserve critical habitats for T&E species.199 Addi-
tionally, by proactively coordinating with the FWS and the NMFS to prevent 
future ESA listings of species present on military lands—as well as to prevent 
already at-risk and threatened species from becoming further classified as en-
dangered—the DoD is able to effectively avoid future land-use restrictions that 
follow from ESA listings.200 Through these efforts, the DoD is a leader among 
the federal agencies in meeting the congressional intent of using section 
7(a)(1) as both a shield and a sword, protecting itself from future encroach-
ment of ESA land-use restrictions and proactively fighting for T&E species 
recovery to ensure responsible conservation practices on and around military 
lands.201 
C. Other Environmentally-Focused DoD Policies 
In addition to the DoD’s major land management initiatives, several poli-
cies across all military bases indicate the DoD’s commitment to conserving 
                                                                                                                           
duty to initiate programs, either within or independent of their primary missions, which will imple-
ment the so-called recovery plans that FWS and NMFS develop under section 4 of the ESA to rescue 
species from endangered and threatened status . . . . While such [conservation] plans have been devel-
oped [by agencies] for most endangered and threatened species, few have been implemented to any 
significant extent. FWS and NMFS's duty to implement recovery plans and all other federal agencies’ 
duty to conserve species can be made meaningful only by linking the duty to conserve a species to the 
[implementation of] recovery plans developed for that species.”); Interview with Li, supra note 190 
(contending that the DoD is unique among federal agencies in their compliance with the mandate of 
section 7(a)(1)); see also Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (providing that 
federal agencies “shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of [FWS and NMFS], utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the ESA] by carrying out programs for the conservation 
of [listed] endangered species and threatened species”) (emphasis added). 
 199 See Interview with Li, supra note 190 (discussing the DoD’s Legacy Grant projects and how 
they comply with Section 7(a)(1) of the ESA); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (requiring federal 
agencies to implement programs that promote the conservation of T&E species). 
 200 See MILITARY & ESA FACT SHEET, supra note 197, at 1–2 (discussing the requirements under 
section 7 of the ESA for federal agencies to consult with the FWS or NMFS about possible effects on 
T&E species and carry out programs to conserve T&E wildlife species on their lands); Interview with 
Li, supra note 190 (arguing that the DoD is unique among federal agencies in its initiative to comply 
with section 7(a)(1) of the ESA); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (providing that agencies must coor-
dinate with the FWS and the NMFS to provide for conservation efforts for ESA listed species). 
 201 See Ruhl, supra note 198, at 1111 (arguing that the legislative vision of section 7(a)(1) is not 
only that agencies must create conservation plans for T&E species on the agencies’ lands, but also that 
agencies must implement such plans to pursue the recovery and delisting of such species); see also 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174–88 (1978) (tracing the legislative history and underly-
ing policy of section 7(a)(1), and concluding that the final language of the section “reveals an explicit 
congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy of 
saving endangered species”). 
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natural resources and mitigating its environmental impact on its lands.202 The 
DoD and each individual military service have issued regulations, directives, 
and technical manuals on a wide array of responsible environmental practic-
es.203 For instance, the DoD directs every company-sized element (typically 
around 130 to 150 people) to implement an environmental compliance pro-
gram to ensure environmental impacts are considered and risks of ecosystem 
destruction are mitigated during even the smallest-scale military operations.204 
Additionally, several DoD and service-specific regulations provide extensive 
guidance on proper SOPs for conducting hazardous waste management and 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD DIRECTIVE 4715.1, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY (Mar. 19, 
2005), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=400 [https://perma.cc/CW7B-8YRH]; see also infra notes 
207–208 (discussing various DoD policies). 
 203 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 200-1: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND EN-
HANCEMENT (Dec. 13, 2007), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r200_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FT64-TQSJ] (regulating the environmental responsibilities of all Army organiza-
tions and agencies); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 4715.03: NATURAL RESOURCES CON-
SERVATION PROGRAM 18 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/471503p.pdf [https://perma.cc/642U-BWJX] (providing that “[p]rocedures to comply 
with [ESA mandates] shall emphasize military mission requirements and interagency cooperation 
during consultation, species recovery planning, and management activities”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
DOD INSTRUCTION 4715.22: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE POLICY FOR CONTINGENCY LOCATIONS 
1, 4 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/471522p.
pdf?ver=2017-11-14-112330-200 [https://perma.cc/G9Z7-FAXL] (directing all DoD components to 
minimize adverse environmental impact, avoid damage to natural resources, and apply environmental 
management systems to all DoD mission planning); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD MANUAL 4715.20: 
DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.
esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/471520m.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNE2-59DA] 
(providing guidance for DoD components and installations in their efforts to conduct environmental 
restoration). See generally U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM TO AFI 32‑ 7001, 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Apr. 16, 2015), http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/
af_a4/publication/afi32-7001/afi32-7001.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9VV-9DZP] (providing guidance to 
U.S. Air Force components to ensure compliance with environmental legal requirements and minimi-
zation of environmental damage); U.S. ARMY, ARMY TRAINING TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION NO. 
3‑ 34.5: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS (Aug. 10, 2015), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_
pubs/DR_a/pdf/atp3_34x5.epub [https://perma.cc/TLD6-TA8S] (providing guidance to U.S. Army 
components to integrate environmental considerations into all operations); U.S. MARINE CORPS, EN-
VIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND PROTECTION MANUAL, MCO P5090.2A (Aug. 26, 2013), http://
www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%20P5090.2A%20W%20CH%201-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGV5-
DDC5] (updating U.S. Marine Corps policies on “environmental compliance and protection”); U.S. 
NAVY, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5090.1D: ENVIRONMENTAL READINESS PROGRAM 1 (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/SUPSALV/Environmental/OPNAVINST
%205090-1D.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH9P-BKWN] (discussing responsibilities of and providing poli-
cy guidance to all U.S. Navy components “for the management of the environmental, natural, and 
cultural resources for all Navy ships and shore activities”). 
 204 See DOD INSTRUCTION 4715.22, supra note 203, at 4 (directing all DoD components to mini-
mize adverse environmental impact, avoid damage to natural resources, and assess environmental 
considerations in operation planning); Michael Moran, Modern Military Force Structures, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 26, 2006), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modern-military-force-
structures [https://perma.cc/7PWU-VGJ3] (discussing the sizes of military organizational units). 
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conserving wildlife species on military installations.205 For instance, most in-
dividual bases require military units to ensure that areas downrange from 
weapons ranges remain clear of all wildlife.206 Another notable example of 
these types of responsible land management policies is the DoD’s employment 
of “Seibert Stakes” on installations to designate portions of training areas that 
are off-limits because of their environmental sensitivity.207 These types of 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See, e.g., U.S. AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 32-7064, INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCES MAN-
AGEMENT 33 (Nov. 22, 2016), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a4/publication/afi32-
7064/afi32-7064.pdf [https://perma.cc/73LD-MLRN] (directing Air Force installations to develop 
ecosystem management strategies that protect threatened and endangered species); U.S. ARMY REGU-
LATION, AR 200-1, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT 1 (Dec. 13, 2007), 
http://www.dodnaturalresources.net/AR200-1_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAU2-EAD8] (implement-
ing “[f]ederal, [s]tate, and local environmental laws and [DoD] policies for preserving, protecting, 
conserving, and restoring the quality of the environment”); U.S. ARMY REGULATION, AR 200-3, 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAND, FOREST AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 2 (Feb. 28, 1995), https://www.
asaie.army.mil/Public/IE/Toolbox/documents/ar200_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58ET-ARA5] (stating 
that it is “the Army’s goal to systemically conserve biological diversity on Army lands within the 
context of its mission”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 4715.03, NATURAL RESOURCES 
CONSERVATION PROGRAM 18 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/471503p.pdf [https://perma.cc/642U-BWJX] (providing that “[p]rocedures to comply 
with [ESA mandates] shall emphasize military mission requirements and interagency cooperation 
during consultation, species recovery planning, and management activities”); U.S. DEF. LOGISTICS 
AGENCY, JOINT SERVICE REGULATION, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY REGULATION (DLAR) 
4145.41, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/J5StrategicPlansPolicy/
PublicIssuances/r4145.41.pdf [https://perma.cc/743B-X8JX] (providing standards for all DoD com-
ponents for the packaging, storage, and handling of hazardous material); U.S. MARINE CORPS ORDER 
(MCO) P5090.2, ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND PROTECTION MANUAL 3 (Aug. 26, 2013), 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%20P5090.2A%20W%20CH%201-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4KVF-55UZ] (directing Marine bases to manage natural resources to support the military mission 
while protecting such resources); U.S. NAVY INSTRUCTION, OPNAVINST 5090.1D, ENVIRONMENTAL 
READINESS PROGRAM MANUAL (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/
SUPSALV/Environmental/OPNAVINST%205090-1D.pdf [https://perma.cc/UTM9-C8GH] (providing 
standards “for the management of the environment and natural resources for all Navy ships and shore 
activities”). 
 206 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, FORT LEONARD WOOD REGULATION 210-14, RANGES, TRAINING AREAS, 
AND TRAINING FACILITIES 28 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/download_file/
force/5242/937 [https://perma.cc/2HNF-9QRE] (requiring units to cease fire when wildlife is ob-
served within or entering the range impact area). 
 207 U.S. ARMY, INFORMATION PAPER IMNE-DRM-PWE: USE OF SEIBERT STAKES (June 1, 
2008), https://www.drum.army.mil/PublicWorks/Documents/16-Off%20Limits08PAP.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G29T-ZLKQ]. Seibert Stakes are a 16-inch piece of PVC pipe wrapped with bands of white, 
yellow, and red reflective tape; one side of the stake has a vertical black band that faces into the pro-
tected area to depict the “off-limits” area to military units conducting training. Id. These reflective 
stakes are often placed visibly along the perimeter of restricted areas to protect designated critical 
habitats or other environmentally sensitive areas. Id. For example, the Army uses Seibert Stakes to 
mark environmentally sensitive “off-limits” areas, including bird banding stations, wetland mitigation 
sites, historic buildings, prehistoric and historic archaeological sites, sensitive ecological areas, sensi-
tive habitats, and areas of suspected or known contamination. Id. For a photograph of a Seibert Stake 
marking the boundary between a road in a military training area and an “off-limits” archaeological 
site, see Ken Humphrey, Wyoming Army National Guard Protects Archaeological Sites on Camp 
Guernsey, http://wyoarchaeo.state.wy.us/index.php/learn/wyoming-archaeology-awareness-month/
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SOPs have the cumulative effect of reinforcing environmental best-practices 
by DoD units at all levels.208 
III. FOLLOWING THE DOD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP 
The DoD has demonstrated the unexpected compatibility between self-
interested organizational goals, like the military’s national security mission, 
and seemingly unrelated environmental protection objectives.209 Nevertheless, 
despite the success of the DoD’s initiatives in improving military readiness, 
reducing federal costs, and protecting the environment, there are several areas 
in which to improve upon the effectiveness of these efforts.210 Additionally, 
because the DoD is just one of many government agencies with a significant 
land management responsibility, there are numerous untapped opportunities for 
others to follow the DoD’s example.211 In order to capitalize on the DoD’s en-
vironmental initiatives, Congress should provide greater funding and encour-
age other federal agencies to develop effective land-use strategies with neigh-
boring landowners by entering into compatible-use conservation partnerships 
like the ACUB or Sentinel Landscapes programs.212 
This Part argues that there are several opportunities for the DoD to im-
prove its own land management efforts and for the federal government to en-
                                                                                                                           
project-a-day/66-september-11-camp-guernsey [https://perma.cc/W3QJ-9A77] (photograph taken by 
Tracy Hall, 2016). 
 208 See ARMY REGULATION 200-1, supra note 203, at 16 (providing that “[i]nstallations . . . will 
establish and maintain documented [standard operating procedures] to avoid unacceptable environ-
mental impacts from these operations and activities”). 
 209 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 55 (discussing the DoD’s recent innovation in addressing en-
croachment); Light, supra note 6, at 887 (arguing that the traditional narrative of the military as stand-
ing directly opposed to environmental law is incorrect and that the DoD’s high energy use is compati-
ble with pursuing sustainable energy development, which can further both military and environmental 
interests); see also THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at xxiii (concluding that DoD REPI projects 
improve military readiness by preventing incompatible land use in areas surrounding military installa-
tions). 
 210 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at xxiii (arguing that the DoD REPI program’s limited 
success at combatting encroachment indicates that Congress should invest significantly more re-
sources in the program for its buffering activities to be more effective). One method for the DoD to 
further mitigate encroachment from ESA restrictions is to coordinate conservation efforts with other 
agencies that manage significant amounts of land with rich biodiversity, such as the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) and U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”), because destructive activities by those 
agencies sometimes decreases the available wildlife habitats within their lands, pushing even more 
T&E species onto DoD lands. Id. at xx, 17–18, 36, 70. 
 211 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 55 (discussing the DoD’s successful replication of its buffering 
techniques in different locations); SCHULTZ, supra note 185, at 1–2 (discussing the mutually benefi-
cial aspects of the Sentinel Landscapes and their potential to serve the land-use objectives of multiple 
stakeholders); VINCENT ET AL., supra note 49, at 1 (discussing the several federal agencies with large 
land management responsibilities); Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059 (explaining that the BLM 
manages approximately 250 million surface acres of land). 
 212 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at xxiii, 80 (arguing that Congress must invest more to 
buffer as much as possible before it becomes too expensive or impossible to do so in the future). 
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courage other agencies to follow the DoD’s example in establishing mutually 
beneficial land management partnerships.213 Section A of this Part argues that 
the federal government should direct greater public attention toward the DoD’s 
land management solutions because of the potential for such attention to posi-
tively influence the behavior of other public and private actors.214 Section B 
argues that Congress and the President should capitalize on the DoD’s effec-
tive land management initiatives by further encouraging DoD compatible-use 
buffer programs, increasing the number of Sentinel Landscapes, and incentiv-
izing other federal agencies to establish similar partnerships to more responsi-
bly manage natural resources on public lands.215 
A. Directing Greater Public Attention Toward  
DoD’s Land Management Initiatives 
Informing American society about the DoD’s innovative environmental 
effortsespecially its responsible land management effortshas the capacity 
to further national security interests while simultaneously influencing public 
attitudes regarding environmental protection.216 This potential benefit is an 
example of the so-called “military-environmental complex,” an adaptation of 
the concept of the military-industrial complex, which itself is a broad idea, part 
of which asserts that the military’s constant need for cutting edge technologies 
acts as a driver for innovation and advancing civilian industries.217 Although 
the military’s capacity to influence public behavior is most apparent in the 
DoD’s recognition of climate change and its investment in renewable energy 
technologies, the DoD’s responsible land management efforts also have the 
potential to affect political decision-making and individual attitudes toward 
land and wildlife conservation.218 Directing greater public attention to the mili-
tary’s natural resource management initiatives, such as the DoD’s buffer part-
nerships, has the potential to encourage other government agencies and private 
landowners to further collaborate with one another to ensure compatible land 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See infra notes 216–249 and accompanying text. 
 214 See infra notes 216–227 and accompanying text. 
 215 See infra notes 228–249 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Light, supra note 23, at 1809–10 (arguing that military interests have a long history of 
affecting societal preferences, manifested in political policy and individual consumer attitudes). 
 217 Light, supra note 6, at 895, 900, 921, 938 (discussing the potential “spillover effects” of the 
DoD’s renewable energy operations—in particular, the spillover into the private sector of the DoD’s 
new renewable energy technologies and the DoD’s emphasis on purchasing renewable energy—and 
the potential for such efforts to influence public behavior). 
 218 See Light, supra note 23, at 1809–10 (discussing the potential for the DoD’s renewable energy 
initiatives and its validation of climate change as a national security threat to influence political action 
and individual consumer attitudes). Although several conservation-focused NGOs and the FWS ac-
tively educate the public about military land stewardship, there has not yet been a formal study to 
examine public attitudes toward the DoD’s conservation efforts. RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 68. 
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use and conserve natural resources.219 Increased public support for the DoD’s 
conservation initiatives may also place political pressure on military and polit-
ical leaders who are resistant to such environmental efforts.220 
Additionally, raising public awareness of the threats that encroachment 
poses to military readiness and national security may further the DoD’s interest 
in mitigating future restrictions on its training operations on military installa-
tions.221 If current or prospective owners of land near DoD bases understand 
that increased development of areas surrounding military training areas and 
testing ranges restricts both civilian and military activity, they may be less like-
ly to purchase or develop such land, or they may be more willing to cooperate 
with the DoD and other agencies to ensure compatible land use.222 
Finally, directing greater public attention to the military’s environmental 
protection efforts—especially those aimed at protecting and recovering T&E 
wildlife species—has the potential to influence individual attitudes and behavior 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 67–68 (explaining that the DoD’s conservation efforts are not 
generally known or understood by the public); THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 59 (noting that 
public press and community outreach are crucial aspects of successful installation buffering pro-
grams); Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,059 (arguing that the DoD does not receive enough credit 
for its responsible environmental stewardship); see also Light, supra note 23, at 1810 (suggesting that 
the national security impetus for the DoD’s energy efforts may inspire support among political con-
servatives on issues relating to climate change). But see Light, supra note 23, at 1785 (discussing 
research that suggests that promoting military initiatives in terms of their environmental benefits has 
the potential to “backfire” among individuals who do not place a high value on protecting the envi-
ronment by leading such individuals to oppose the DoD’s initiatives because of their environmental 
focus). 
 220 See Light, supra note 23, at 1778 (arguing that the military’s environmental initiatives and 
their national security impetus have the potential to influence the behavior of those who would not 
otherwise appreciate the need modify their behavior to address climate change); see also Cruden et al., 
supra note 18, at 11,063–64 (arguing that much of the public is not aware of the DoD’s environmental 
efforts, and that leaders must publicize the DoD’s programs to ensure that the military continues to 
have the budgetary means to pursue such initiatives in the future). 
 221 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54 (discussing the negative consequences of encroachment on 
military operations); see also THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 11 (concluding that encroachment 
on military installations impedes military readiness and advocating for a better understanding of the 
sources of encroachment to mitigate its effects). 
 222 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54 (discussing the negative consequences of encroachment and 
intense civilian development directly outside of military bases); see also THIN GREEN LINE, supra 
note 96, at 11 (noting that extensive land development outside military bases, especially through sub-
urban sprawl, is one of the most significant causes of encroachment). For instance, if zoning boards 
and landowners understand that developing land for residential purposes too close to a DoD artillery 
impact area or airstrip would restrict military units to firing loud weapons or flying aircraft only dur-
ing certain daytime hours—thereby reducing property values for nearby commercial developments 
where activity takes place largely during daylight hours—those landowners may be more willing to 
coordinate with base commanders, either by developing their land with the DoD’s operating needs in 
mind or by selling portions of land or conservation easements to the DoD and its buffering partners. 
See Service Programs, supra note 177 (discussing the procedures that each military service uses to 
establish buffer zones); see also Arasin, supra note 179 (explaining how buffering programs allow the 
military to encumber large areas of land and noting that buffering is often in the best interests of both 
the DoD installations and the landowners who sell land to the buffering partners). 
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toward natural resource conservation.223 Although less than 40% of Americans 
have high trust for other major government institutions, public confidence in the 
military has remained consistently high over the last decade, with 70–82% of 
Americans trusting the military “a [g]reat deal [or q]uite a lot.”224 This public 
support of the military has the capacity to encourage civilian organizations and 
private citizen landowners to similarly comply with environmental regula-
tions.225 For example, greater public awareness of the DoD’s unique compliance 
with the legislative intent of section 7(a)(1) of the ESA—especially through its 
proactive conservation programs and coordination with the FWS and NMFS—
may promote similar coordination by other federal, state, and local agencies that 
manage large amounts of public land.226 Although several state agencies already 
communicate effectively with the FWS and proactively employ conservation 
strategies to a similar extent as the DoD, more federal and state agencies would 
be well served to recognize that stricter compliance with section 7(a)(1) of the 
ESA will likely increase their ability to utilize their land without restrictions in 
the future.227 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See Light, supra note 23, at 1810 (suggesting that publicizing the DoD’s national security and 
military readiness motivations for its environmentally-conscious policies could inspire support from 
political leaders to address climate change); see also Cruden et al., supra note 18, at 11,063–64 (argu-
ing that leaders should better broadcast the DoD’s innovative environmental efforts, including its 
wildlife conservation buffering initiatives, as well as the military readiness basis for such efforts, 
because budgets will continue to tighten). 
 224 Saad, supra note 8; Frank Newport, Americans Continue to Express Highest Confidence in 
Military, GALLUP (June 17, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/192917/americans-continue-express-
highest-confidence-military.aspx [https://perma.cc/RN36-KTT7]. The average confidence level of 
Americans across fourteen U.S. societal and government institutions (the percentage of those polled 
who said that they had “a [g]reat deal [or q]uite a lot” of confidence in each respective institution) in 
2004 was 43%, compared with 33% in 2018. Saad, supra note 8; Newport, supra. In contrast, the 
average confidence of Americans in the military was 75% in 2004, and remained high at 74% in 2018. 
Saad, supra note 8; Newport, supra. 
 225 See Light, supra note 23, at 1778 (discussing the potential “spillover” effects of the military’s 
renewable energy operations and recognition of climate change to the private sector). 
 226 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 54–55 (describing the DoD’s buffering efforts); MILITARY & 
ESA FACT SHEET, supra note 197, at 1–2 (discussing the provisions of section 7(a) of the ESA and 
the DoD’s interagency cooperation with the FWS to reduce ESA land-use restrictions on military 
bases); THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at xx, 17–18, 36, 70 (noting that destructive activity by the 
BLM and the USFS potentially worsens the DoD’s encroachment problems by pushing even greater 
numbers of T&E wildlife species onto DoD lands); see also Ruhl, supra note 198, at 1111 (arguing 
that the intent of section 7(a)(1) is not only that agencies must create conservation plans for T&E 
species, but also that agencies must implement such plans to pursue the recovery and delisting of such 
species). 
 227 See Interview with Li, supra note 190 (noting that the DoD is one of the only federal agencies 
to proactively develop wildlife conservation programs to reduce further ESA listings on its lands); see 
also THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 23, 34–36 (discussing several state efforts to protect T&E 
wildlife habitats by establishing cooperative partnerships, ensuring thoughtful zoning decision-
making, and purchasing or encouraging others to purchase conservation easements). 
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B. Capitalizing on the DoD’s Innovative Land Management Initiatives 
Despite the DoD’s recent innovations in responsible land management 
techniques, there are still opportunities to further reduce encroachment on mili-
tary operations and mitigate the military’s adverse environmental impact on its 
lands.228 For example, regardless of the EPA’s historically inadequate enforce-
ment of the RCRA and CERCLA on DoD installations, the DoD should proac-
tively pursue more effective remedial strategies to expeditiously clean up con-
taminated military sites.229 This would provide a two-fold benefit for the DoD 
by mitigating future land-use encroachment from federal and state hazardous 
waste regulations and simultaneously avoiding potential litigation directed to-
ward the DoD’s cleanup delays.230 Additionally, despite the DoD’s overall in-
novation in ESA compliance, armed conflicts and other military operations 
around the world continue to inflict significant harm on wildlife populations in 
general.231 Therefore, as with other federal environmental laws, the DoD 
should assert wartime exemptions to ESA mandates only under necessary and 
limited circumstances rather than in broad applications.232 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See, e.g., THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 95–105 (providing several recommendations to 
improve the DoD’s conservation buffering efforts). 
 229 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 9620(e)(2) (2012) (requiring remedial action and interagency agreement by the relevant 
federal agency head and the EPA Administrator within 180 days of a contaminated site’s listing on the 
NPL). Although the DoD has made improvements in its efforts to more responsibly manage its haz-
ardous waste, DoD installations still comprise about 80% of all contaminated sites listed on the NPL. 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env’t & the Economy of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce 
(Sept. 11, 2015) (testimony of Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Administrator, Office of Land and Emer-
gency Management), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF18/20160421/104837/HHRG-114-IF18-
Wstate-StanislausM-20160421.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N8E-G5V3]. But see HAZARDOUS WASTE 
CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that, as of 2013, the DoD had reduced the number of installa-
tions that had not completed a CERCLA interagency agreement with the EPA to one). See generally 
Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL) Sites—by State, EPA (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.epa.
gov/superfund/national-priorities-list-npl-sites-state [https://perma.cc/VHA6-ATJC] (providing a 
complete list of current NPL sites, i.e. the locations with the most serious hazardous waste contamina-
tion in the country). 
 230 See HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, supra note 13, at 12 (discussing the continuing delays in 
the DoD’s cleanup of its contaminated sites). 
 231 See Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 445–46 (examining the detrimental effects of armed con-
flict on the environment and wildlife species); Sadler & Lean, supra note 83 (providing statistics on 
whale and dolphin casualties due to sonar use by U.S. Navy ships and submarines); Ed Yong, When 
Humans War, Animals Die, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2018/01/when-humans-war-animals-die/549902/ [https://perma.cc/6K5L-D73N] (examining a 
recent study that demonstrated a strong correlation between armed conflict and the decline of Africa’s 
wildlife population). 
 232 See BEARDEN, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that “[t]hroughout the congressional debate over 
[proposed narrow military exemptions from ESA provisions during the 108th Congress], there was 
significant disagreement among Members of Congress regarding the military need for them in light of 
the lack of data on the effect of these statutes on readiness overall, and the potential impact of the 
exemptions on animal and plant species”); see also 16 U.S.C. 1536(j) (2012) (authorizing a special 
committee to grant an exemption from ESA provisions if the Secretary of Defense finds it necessary 
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Several of the DoD’s land management initiatives should be expanded to 
further both military and environmental interests.233 One of the most effective 
DoD land management initiatives is its employment of compatible-use buffer 
areas around military installations.234 Notwithstanding the value of such buffer 
areas, there are strong pressures for civilian actors—including both private 
developers as well as state and local governments—to develop areas around 
military installations, because such areas are often the largest remaining con-
tiguous stretches of undeveloped land in a locality.235 Once such land is subdi-
vided under several different owners, it becomes more difficult and expensive 
to procure such land for buffering purposes.236 Therefore, it is imperative for 
Congress to avoid potential encroachment issues by authorizingand possibly 
incentivizingthe DoD to purchase significantly more interests (through its 
compatible-use buffering program partners) in buffer zones around domestic 
and international military bases before doing so becomes too expensive or im-
practical.237 In order to procure additional funds for such buffering efforts, the 
DoD could coordinate greater cost-sharing with other federal and state agen-
cies that have a stake in preserving such land.238 Where outright land purchases 
are not an option for either a military service or its buffer partners at a specific 
base location, Congress should further encourage the DoD to purchase conser-
vation easements or enter into long-term leases with governmental or private 
landowners to create lasting conservation of those lands.239 Nevertheless, the 
                                                                                                                           
for national security); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 
17 Stat. 1392 (2003) (amending the ESA’s requirements for critical habitat designations to require that 
the DOI considers national security interests); National Defense Authorization Act FY2003 § 315, 
Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002) (providing that section 2 of the MBTA (16 U.S.C. § 703) 
shall not apply to the incidental taking of a migratory bird by a member of the Armed Forces during a 
military readiness activity for a period specified by the DOI). 
 233 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 53 (noting that the DoD’s buffering activities have 
been successful in ensuring compatible land use and preserving critical wildlife habitats, but there are 
areas upon which the DoD should improve to further mitigate encroachment in the future). 
 234 See RIPLEY, supra note 19, at 55 (discussing the DoD’s use of buffer programs). 
 235 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 80–81 (discussing the pressures to develop the re-
maining open lands in the United States because historic activities that required large tracts of land, 
such as farming, are now less profitable than commercial or residential developments). 
 236 See id. at 81. It is cheaper and easier to buffer before land is subdivided. Id. Even if the agri-
cultural land has not yet been subdivided, buying sooner is preferable because of rising land prices. Id. 
Land prices continue to increase because of the potential for development and because large tracts of 
land are becoming scarcer in most parts of the United States. Id. 
 237 See id. at 80 (urging Congress and the DoD to undertake greater buffering efforts before it 
becomes too costly or otherwise impossible to do so). 
 238 See id. at 87–88 (recommending that the DoD leverage other federal agency funds similar to 
its cost-sharing with the USDA and DOI for buffering partnerships). Possible federal agencies that 
could allocate portions of their budget to mutually beneficial buffering efforts include the USFS, EPA, 
and BLM. See id. at 110 (noting that USFS, DoD, and BLM are the federal landowners with the most 
T&E wildlife species). 
 239 See id. at 88 (discussing several buffer options for the DoD). 
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DoD should continue to require such land agreements to be subject to certain 
safeguards—such as those that revert land interests to another party if the part-
ner does not meet the terms—to protect the DoD’s long-term interests.240 
The DoD’s Sentinel Landscapes program and other such collaborations 
have created effective and mutually beneficial relationships between military 
bases, NGOs, state and local governments, and private landowners.241 These 
partnerships are critical to ensuring compatible land use on areas surrounding 
DoD bases.242 Nevertheless, because the Sentinel Landscapes include only ten 
of the more than 420 major military installations across the country, and none 
of the U.S. military bases in other countries, the potential benefits of this initia-
tive and the DoD’s other creative partnerships are not fully realized.243 Con-
gress and the President should therefore encourage the DoD to establish more 
Sentinel Landscapes across the United States and, potentially, around the 
world.244 Although it is difficult to comprehensively quantify the monetary 
value of an individual base’s avoidance of operational restrictions and training 
workarounds, Congress should also provide a credit system that would return 
to each installation’s budget a portion of the total costs saved through its in-
volvement in such partnerships.245 It is important, however, that each individu-
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Arasin, supra note 179 (explaining the safeguards built into such partnerships). 
 241 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 89 (discussing the need for such partnership initia-
tives); see also SCHULTZ, supra note 185, at 2 (discussing the mutually beneficial aspects of the Sen-
tinel Landscapes Partnership). 
 242 See REPI REPORT 2018, supra note 140, at 3–4 (discussing the benefits of Sentinel Land-
scapes for civilian communities and military installations); see also THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, 
at 89 (discussing the need for such partnership initiatives). 
 243 See generally SENTINEL LANDSCAPES 2016 REPORT, supra note 182 (providing data on the 
DoD installations included in the Sentinel Landscapes Partnership). 
 244 See REPI REPORT 2018, supra note 140, at 3–4 (discussing the benefits of Sentinel Land-
scapes for civilian communities and the military installations). 
 245 See Light, supra note 23, at 1808 (arguing that greater understanding of the value of ecosys-
tem conservation may inspire investment by government and industry); see also U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-621T, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT 
AND PUBLIC WORKS: MILITARY TRAINING, DOD APPROACH TO MANAGING ENCROACHMENT ON 
TRAINING RANGES STILL EVOLVING, STATEMENT OF BARRY W. HOLMAN, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE 
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES (2003), https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/109786.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VG2C-4DYS] (noting that “although some services have reported higher costs because of encroach-
ment-related workarounds for training, service data systems do not capture the costs comprehensive-
ly”). This credit system could be similar to the DoD’s energy savings incentives, such as the one that 
authorizes the DoD to reinvest half of its energy cost savings into additional conservation measures 
without further congressional appropriations. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2912 (West 2018) (authorizing the 
DoD to reinvest half of its energy cost savings into additional conservation measures without further 
congressional appropriations); id. § 2916 (authorizing the DoD to sell to a utility company the elec-
tricity it produces from alternative or cogeneration facilities under the DoD’s jurisdiction, and to cred-
it any proceeds to the appropriation account of the military department concerned for the supply of 
electricity). 
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al installation continues to enjoy wide discretion in how it operates its partner-
ship because of the unique land-use interests in each geographic region.246 
Compatible land-use partnerships, such as those established by the DoD, 
are especially important given the federal government’s increasing retreat from 
environmental regulation.247 Therefore, whether or not the trend of federal de-
regulation continues, Congress should further encourage the use of such part-
nerships by other federal agencies, especially those with large land manage-
ment responsibilities, such as the BLM and the USFS.248 Finally, in order to 
promote other agencies’ compliance with section 7(a)(1) of the ESA, Congress 
and the President should direct agencies to follow the DoD’s example in pursu-
ing similar wildlife conservation efforts and coordinating a recovery credit sys-
tem with the FWS or NMFS to reduce ESA restrictions on agencies’ land.249 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the historic image of the military as a force of destruction, the 
U.S. Department of Defense has demonstrated unexpected leadership and in-
novation in its environmental protection efforts over the past decade. In addi-
tion to its commitment to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and switch to re-
newable energy sources, the DoD’s most unexpected environmental initiatives 
have arguably been its adaptive solutions to its land management challenges. 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 89–90 (discussing the unique balance of interests 
between bases and local partners at each installation). The motivations of each installation’s buffering 
partners are often diverse, and the relationships between these various interests differ from one instal-
lation to the next. See id. at 88. For example, at Naval Air Station Whiting Field, California, Navy 
base commanders contracted with NGOs and state conservation groups to complete various buffering 
projects—such as preserving habitats and establishing nature trails—in order to prevent encroachment 
by civilian noise complaints, radio frequency interference, and commercial airspace interference; the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture did the same to preserve agricultural lands around the base; and Santa 
Rosa County partners did so to utilize some of the buffer land as a county off-road vehicle park and an 
industrial park. Id. at 89. In contrast to those parties’ challenges and interests, the buffer partnership 
established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, involved the Army seeking to relieve ESA land-use re-
strictions on its training lands and charitable environmental NGOs seeking to protect the unique 
Sandhills ecosystem and recover the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker species. Id. at 205; see 
supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the Fort Bragg buffering efforts). 
 247 See 2019 REPI REPORT, supra note 140, at 2, 5 (discussing the benefits of the DoD coopera-
tive partnerships); THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 81–89 (discussing examples of the DoD’s 
success with buffer programs); Popovich et al., supra note 3 (discussing the Trump Administration’s 
reversal of more than sixty environmental rules since January of 2017). 
 248 See THIN GREEN LINE, supra note 96, at 85, 89, 99 (explaining that—although several federal 
and state agencies do proactively establish cooperative partnerships with other government agencies, 
NGOs, and private landowners—Congress should further encourage such collaborations). 
 249 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (requiring that agencies develop conservation programs); Cruden 
et al., supra note 18, at 11,061 (discussing the DoD’s pilot program of coordinating with the FWS to 
earn “recovery credits” to reduce ESA restrictions at Fort Hood, Texas); Interview with Li, supra note 
190 (arguing that other federal and state agencies should follow the DoD’s example in ESA compli-
ance). 
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By undertaking innovative programs to preserve undeveloped land that sepa-
rates bases from civilian populations and to protect endangered species and 
ecosystems both on and around bases, the DoD simultaneously combats en-
croachment and protects the environment. Although its primary objective in 
these efforts is to ensure military readiness, the DoD has demonstrated that 
environmental protection is not always a zero-sum game: Interests that were 
previously considered incompatible, like protecting national security and pro-
tecting the environment, may prove not only consistent but mutually support-
ing. 
Although there are still areas in which the DoD must improve its conser-
vation and anti-encroachment efforts on military installations, greater public 
attention should be directed toward the DoD’s responsible land management. 
Additionally, Congress and the DoD should seek to promote more cooperative 
partnerships—such as compatible-use buffer areas, Sentinel Landscapes, and 
similar programs—wherever the federal government manages land. Finally, 
Congress and the President should encourage other federal agencies to follow 
the DoD’s environmental leadership. Despite the lasting legislative stalemate 
over environmental policy and the increasing federal rollback of the environ-
mental regulatory framework, the unexpected ascension of the U.S. Military as 
an environmental protector demonstrates that responsible land management 
policies may yet successfully pass through political gridlock, shielded by mu-
tually-supporting allies such as the DoD and its national security mission. 
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